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Credit mismatch and breakdown

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  • Becsi, Zsolt
  • Li, Victor E.
  • Wang, Ping
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    Abstract

    This paper studies the phenomenon of mismatch in a decentralized credit market where borrowers and lenders must engage in costly search to establish credit relationships. Our dynamic general equilibrium framework integrates incentive based informational frictions with a matching process highlighted by (i) borrowers' endogenous market entry and exit decision (entry frictions) and (ii) time and resource costs necessary to locate credit opportunities (search frictions). A key feature of the incentive compatible loan contract negotiated between borrowers and lenders is the interaction of informational frictions (in the form of moral hazard) with entry and search frictions. We find that the removal of entry barriers can eliminate incentive-based equilibrium credit rationing. More generally, entry and incentive frictions are important in understanding the extent of credit rationing and credit mismatch, while search and incentive frictions are important for understanding credit market breakdown.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

    Volume (Year): 59 (2013)
    Issue (Month): C ()
    Pages: 109-125

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:59:y:2013:i:c:p:109-125

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer

    Related research

    Keywords: Entry; Moral hazard; Credit rationing; Credit mismatch; Credit-market breakdown;

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