1. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, . "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocitys," IEW - Working Papers iewwp040, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gaechter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter, 2000. "Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 14(3), pages 159-181, Summer. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Huck, Steffen, 1999. "Responder behavior in ultimatum offer games with incomplete information," Journal of Economic Psychology, Elsevier, vol. 20(2), pages 183-206, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
3. Dufwenberg, Martin & Gneezy, Uri, 2000. "Measuring Beliefs in an Experimental Lost Wallet Game," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 30(2), pages 163-182, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part II: Application to Missions and Accountability of Government Agencies," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 199-217, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness, Incentives, and Contractual Choices," IEW - Working Papers iewwp020, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
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   • Fehr, Ernst & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2000. "Fairness, incentives, and contractual choices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1057-1068, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Clark, Kenneth & Sefton, Martin, 2001. "The Sequential Prisoner's Dilemma: Evidence on Reciprocation," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 111(468), pages 51-68, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Dufwenberg, Martin & Kirchsteiger, Georg, 2000. "Reciprocity and wage undercutting," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 44(4-6), pages 1069-1078, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gachter & Georg Kirchsteiger, 1997. "Reciprocity as a Contract Enforcement Device: Experimental Evidence," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 65(4), pages 833-860, July.
9. Fehr, Ernst & Kirchsteiger, George & Riedl, Arno, 1993. "Does Fairness Prevent Market Clearing? An Experimental Investigation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(2), pages 437-59, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Abbink, Klaus & Irlenbusch, Bernd & Renner, Elke, 2000. "The moonlighting game: An experimental study on reciprocity and retribution," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(2), pages 265-277, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Roland Benabou & Jean Tirole, 2003. "Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivation," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 70(3), pages 489-520, 07. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
12. Dewatripont, Mathias & Jewitt, Ian & Tirole, Jean, 1999. "The Economics of Career Concerns, Part I: Comparing Information Structures," Review of Economic Studies, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 66(1), pages 183-98, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
13. Eline C.M. van der Heijden & Jan H.M. Nelissen & Jan J.M. Potters & Harrie A.A. Verbon, 2001. "Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 01-087/3, Tinbergen Institute. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
    • Heijden, E.C.M. van der & Nelissen, J.H.M. & Potters, J.J.M., 1999. "Simple and complex gift exchange in the laboratory," Discussion Paper 78, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • van der Heijden, Eline C M, et al, 2001. "Simple and Complex Gift Exchange in the Laboratory," Economic Inquiry, Oxford University Press, vol. 39(2), pages 280-97, April.
14. Mitzkewitz, Michael & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1993. "Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 22(2), pages 171-98.
15. Gibbons, Robert & Waldman, Michael, 1999. "Careers in organizations: Theory and evidence," Handbook of Labor Economics, in: O. Ashenfelter & D. Card (ed.), Handbook of Labor Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 36, pages 2373-2437 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
16. Fama, Eugene F, 1980. "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 88(2), pages 288-307, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
17. Gibbons, Robert & Murphy, Kevin J, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(3), pages 468-505, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Murphy, K.J. & Gibbons, R., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns : Theory and Evidence," Papers 90-09, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
    • Gibbons, R. & Murphy, K.J., 1990. "Optimal Incentive Contracts In The Presence Of Career Concerns: Theory And Evidence," Working papers 563, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
18. Guth, Werner & Huck, Steffen & Ockenfels, Peter, 1996. "Two-Level Ultimatum Bargaining with Incomplete Information: An Experimental Study," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 106(436), pages 593-604, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
19. Emmanuelle Auriol & Guido Friebel & Lambros Pechlivanos, 2002. "Career Concerns in Teams," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(2), pages 289-307, Part. [Downloadable!]
20. Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," CEPR Discussion Papers 2790, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus M. Schmidt, . "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," IEW - Working Papers iewwp072, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
    • Fehr, Ernst & Klein, Alexander & Schmidt, Klaus M., 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," Discussion Papers in Economics 18, University of Munich, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    • Ernst Fehr & Alexander Klein & Klaus Schmidt, 2001. "Fairness, Incentives and Contractual Incompleteness," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
21. Robert Gibbons & Kevin J. Murphy, 1992. "Optimal Incentive Contracts in the Presence of Career Concerns: Theory and Evidence," NBER Working Papers 3792, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
22. Fredrik Andersson, 2002. "Career Concerns, Contracts, and Effort Distortions," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 20(1), pages 42-58, January. [Downloadable!]
23. Kagel, John H. & Kim, Chung & Moser, Donald, 1996. "Fairness in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Information and Asymmetric Payoffs," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 13(1), pages 100-110, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

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1. Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2004. "An experimental test of career concerns," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse20_2004, University of Bonn, Germany. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2004. "An experimental test of career concerns," Royal Holloway, University of London: Discussion Papers in Economics 04/31, Department of Economics, Royal Holloway University of London, revised Nov 2004. [Downloadable!]
   • Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht & Raab, Philippe, 2004. "An Experimental Test of Career Concerns," IZA Discussion Papers 1405, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
2. Alexander K. Koch & Albrecht Morgenstern & Philippe Raab, 2009. "Career concerns incentives: An experimental test," Economics Working Papers 2009-01, School of Economics and Management, University of Aarhus. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Koch, Alexander K. & Morgenstern, Albrecht & Raab, Philippe, 2009. "Career concerns incentives: An experimental test," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 72(1), pages 571-588, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)