Revisiting the case for a populist central banker
AbstractIt is known that discretionary policy may give rise to an infaltionary bias if wages are negotiated in nominal terms. It has recently been argued that this bias can be eliminated, and welfare maximized, by the appointment of a central banker who does not care at all about inflation.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 46 (2002)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- Lippi, Francesco, 1999. "Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker," CEPR Discussion Papers 2306, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Francesco Lippi, 2000. "Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker," Temi di discussione (Economic working papers) 386, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
- Lippi, F., 2000. "Revisiting the Case for a Populist Central Banker," Papers 386, Banca Italia - Servizio di Studi.
- E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
- J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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