Efficiency losses from tax distortions vs. government control
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 43 (1999)
Issue (Month): 4-6 (April)
Pages: 1095-1103
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Related research
Keywords:References
References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- unknown, 1989. "Privatization and people`s capitalism," Discussion Paper Serie A 179, University of Bonn, Germany.
- Byrd, William A., 1987. "The impact of the two-tier plan/market system in chinese industry," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 11(3), pages 295-308, September.
- Wei Li, 1999. "A Tale of Two Reforms," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 30(1), pages 120-136, Spring.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2008.
"Why is the public sector more labor-intensive? A distortionary tax argument,"
Journal of Economics,
Springer, vol. 94(2), pages 105-124, July.
- Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2004. "Why is the Public Sector More Labor-Intensive? A Distortionary Tax Argument," CESifo Working Paper Series 1259, CESifo Group Munich.
- Poutvaara, Panu & Wagener, Andreas, 2004. "Why Is the Public Sector More Labor-Intensive? A Distortionary Tax Argument," IZA Discussion Papers 1413, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Gordon, Roger H, 2001. "Taxes and Privatization," CEPR Discussion Papers 2977, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Roland, Gerard & Verdier, Thierry, 2003.
"Law enforcement and transition,"
European Economic Review,
Elsevier, vol. 47(4), pages 669-685, August.
- Roland, Gérard & Verdier, Thierry, 2000. "Law Enforcement and Transition," CEPR Discussion Papers 2501, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Gerard Roland & Thierry Verdier, 1999. "Law Enforcement and Transition," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 262, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan.
- Roland, G. & Verdier, T., 2000. "Law Enforcement and Transition," DELTA Working Papers 2000-25, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
- Poutvaara, Panu & Wagener, Andreas, 2009.
"The Political Economy of Conscription,"
IZA Discussion Papers
4429, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Panu Poutvaara & Andreas Wagener, 2009. "The Political Economy of Conscription," CESifo Working Paper Series 2821, CESifo Group Munich.
- Esfahani, Hadi Salehi, 2000. "Institutions and government controls," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(2), pages 197-229, December.
- Roger Gordon & Wei Li, 2005.
"Tax Structure in Developing Countries: Many Puzzles and a Possible Explanation,"
NBER Working Papers
11267, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gordon, Roger & Li, Wei, 2009. "Tax structures in developing countries: Many puzzles and a possible explanation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(7-8), pages 855-866, August.
- Bai, Chong-En & Lu, Jiangyong & Tao, Zhigang, 2007.
"How Does Privatization Work in China?,"
MPRA Paper
6599, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Bai, Chong-En & Lu, Jiangyong & Tao, Zhigang, 2009. "How does privatization work in China?," Journal of Comparative Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(3), pages 453-470, September.
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