Economic incentives and international trade
AbstractThis paper studies the importance of incentives as a determinant of international trade flows. We argue that barter, countertrade and foreign direct investment can be seen as efficient institutions that mitigate contractual hazards which arise in technology trade, marketing and imperfect capital markets. Paying an import with export goods rather than cash (barter) helps to overcome incentive problems that arise in debt repayment of highly indebted countries. Payment in export goods removes the anonymity of the medium of exchange and thus allows to create a collateral for the creditor. Furthermore, tying an import with an export (countertrade) helps to solve the incentive problems related to the technology transfer to developing countries. The export flow serves as a "hostage" that deters cheating on the quality of the imported technology good. The predictions of the two models are consistent with the pattern of trade of actual barter and countertrade contracts. ZUSAMMENFASSUNG - (Ãkonomische Anreize und internationaler Handel) Â´ Diese Studie untersucht die Bedeutung von Ã¶konomischen Anreizen als BestimmungsgrÃ¶Ãe internationaler HandelsflÃ¼sse. Wir argumentieren, daÃ auslÃ¤ndische Direktinvestitionen, Joint Ventures, der Barterhandel und KompensationsgeschÃ¤fte als effiziente Institutionen angesehen werden kÃ¶nnen, die Anreizprobleme vermeiden helfen, die bei dem Technologiehandel, bei der Vermarktung neuer Produkte und auf unvollkommenen KapitalmÃ¤rkten auftreten. Die Bezahlung eines Imports mit ExportgÃ¼tern, statt mit Geld (Barter), hilft, Anreizprobleme zu Ã¼berwinden, die in hochverschuldeten LÃ¤ndern bei der Schuldentilgung auftreten. Die Zahlung mit GÃ¼tern hebt die AnonymitÃ¤t des Tauschmediums auf und erlaubt somit dem GlÃ¤ubiger eine Sicherheit fÃ¼r seinen Kredit zu schaffen. Die VerknÃ¼pfung eines Imports mit einem Export (Countertrade) hilft die Anreizprobleme zu Ã¼berwinden, die mit dem Technologietransfer in EntwicklungslÃ¤nder verbund
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 42 (1998)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Marin, Dalia, 1990. "Tying in International Trade," Munich Reprints in Economics 3114, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Bulow, Jeremy & Rogoff, Kenneth, 1989.
"A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt,"
Journal of Political Economy,
University of Chicago Press, vol. 97(1), pages 155-78, February.
- Jeremy A.Rogoff Bulow & Kenneth, 1986. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," University of Chicago - George G. Stigler Center for Study of Economy and State 43, Chicago - Center for Study of Economy and State.
- Jeremy I. Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, 1987. "A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt," NBER Working Papers 2088, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-40, September.
- Dalia Marin & Monika Schnitzer, 2002.
"The Economic Institution Of International Barter,"
Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(479), pages 293-316, April.
- Dalia Marin, 1990.
"Tying in International Trade: Evidence on Countertrade,"
in: New Issues in the Uruguay Round, pages 445-462
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dalia Marin, 1990. "Tying in International Trade: Evidence on Countertrade," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 13(3), pages 445-462, 09.
- Chan, Raissa & Hoy, Michael, 1991. "East--West joint ventures and buyback contracts," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 30(3-4), pages 331-343, May.
- Greif, Avner, 1992. "Institutions and International Trade: Lessons from the Commercial Revolution," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 82(2), pages 128-33, May.
- María del Carmen García-Alonso & Paul Levine & Antonia Morga, 2004.
"Export Credit Guarantees, Moral Hazard and Exports Quality,"
Bulletin of Economic Research,
Wiley Blackwell, vol. 56(4), pages 311-327, October.
- Maria del Carmen Garcia-Alonso & Paul Levine & Antonia Morga, 2004. "Export Credit Gurantees, Moral Hazard and Exports Quality," Studies in Economics 0402, Department of Economics, University of Kent.
- Jarko Fidrmuc & Sylvia Kaufmann & Andreas Resch, 2008. "Structural breaks in Austrian foreign trade with Eastern Europe during the early 1970s," Empirica, Springer, vol. 35(5), pages 465-479, December.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.