AbstractA consumer with diminishing marginal utility in consumption, who can search for lower prices, will balance the gains from spreading consumption evenly through time against the benefits of delaying consumption until lower prices are revealed. Optimal programs of consumption, savings and price are characterized for a general formulation of this problem. Intertemporal substitutability is measured by relative-risk aversion. Small relative-risk aversion is sufficient for the intuitive solution: As the best current price rises, more search and less consumption is done. The general model is adapted to special cases. Among other things, this shows that linear utility and sequential search implies calculable reservation prices and consumption only when search stops. However, this characterization is a consequence of the restriction to linear utility. Outside of this context reservation prices and consumption may not be calculable.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.
Volume (Year): 41 (1997)
Issue (Month): 9 (December)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/eer
Other versions of this item:
- Richard Manning & Julian Manning, 1994. "Budget-Constrained Search," Game Theory and Information 9406001, EconWPA, revised 17 Jun 1994.
- Richard Manning & Julian Manning, . ""Budget-constrained Search''," CARESS Working Papres 95-09, University of Pennsylvania Center for Analytic Research and Economics in the Social Sciences.
- Richard Manning & Julian Manning, . "Budget-constrained Search," Penn CARESS Working Papers 30eae25a19493dd4cdf3449d5, Penn Economics Department.
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D8 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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- Morgan, Peter & Manning, Richard, 1985. "Optimal Search," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 53(4), pages 923-44, July.
- Veendorp, E. C. H., 1984. "Sequential search without reservation price," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 16(1-2), pages 53-57.
- Burdett, Kenneth & Judd, Kenneth L, 1983. "Equilibrium Price Dispersion," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 51(4), pages 955-69, July.
- George J. Stigler, 1961. "The Economics of Information," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 69, pages 213.
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