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Estimating cost functions in regulated industries characterized by asymmetric information

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  • Dalen, Dag Morten
  • Gomez-Lobo, Andres

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 41 (1997)
Issue (Month): 3-5 (April)
Pages: 935-942

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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:41:y:1997:i:3-5:p:935-942

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References

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  1. Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1993. "A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262121743, December.
  2. Kenneth Arrow, 1962. "Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention," NBER Chapters, in: The Rate and Direction of Inventive Activity: Economic and Social Factors, pages 609-626 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Thomas Alban, 1995. "Regulating Pollution under Asymmetric Information: The Case of Industrial Wastewater Treatment," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 357-373, May.
  4. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1986. "Using Cost Observation to Regulate Firms," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(3), pages 614-41, June.
  5. Jean-Jaques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "Auctioning Incentive Contracts," Working papers 403, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Gasmi, F & Ivaldi, M & Laffont, Jean Jacques, 1994. "Rent Extraction and Incentives for Efficiency in Recent Regulatory Proposals," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 151-76, May.
  7. Dag Morten Dalen & Andres Gomez Lobo, 1996. "Regulation and incentive contracts: An empirical investigation of the Norwegian bus transport industry," IFS Working Papers, Institute for Fiscal Studies W96/08, Institute for Fiscal Studies.
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Cited by:
  1. Ginés DE RUS & M. Pilar SOCORRO, 2009. "Infrastructure investment and incentives with supranational funding," Departmental Working Papers, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano 2009-18, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
  2. Sheriff, Glenn, 2009. "Implementing second-best environmental policy under adverse selection," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 57(3), pages 253-268, May.
  3. Reiss, Peter C. & Wolak, Frank A., 2003. "Structural Econometric Modeling: Rationales and Examples from Industrial Organization," Research Papers 1831, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
  4. AGRELL, Per & BOGETOFT, Peter, 2013. "Benchmarking and regulation," CORE Discussion Papers, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) 2013008, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  5. Chiappori, Pierre-Andre & Salanie, Bernard, 1997. "Empirical contract theory: The case of insurance data," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 41(3-5), pages 943-950, April.
  6. Beniamina Margari & Fabrizio Erbetta & Carmelo Petraglia & Massimiliano Piacenza, 2007. "Regulatory and environmental effects on public transit efficiency: a mixed DEA-SFA approach," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 131-151, October.
  7. Judy Shaw-Er & Wang Chiang & Ya-Wen Chen, 2005. "Cost structure and technological change of local public transport: the Kaohsiung City Bus case," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 37(12), pages 1399-1410.
  8. Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2003. "Yardstick Based Procurement Design In Natural Resource Management," 2003 Annual Meeting, August 16-22, 2003, Durban, South Africa, International Association of Agricultural Economists 25910, International Association of Agricultural Economists.
  9. Bogetoft, Peter & Nielsen, Kurt, 2003. "DEA based yardstick competition in natural resource management," 2003 Conference (47th), February 12-14, 2003, Fremantle, Australia, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society 57928, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.

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