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Towards an economic theory of incentives in just-in-time manufacturing

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  • Cremer, Jacques

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  • Cremer, Jacques, 1995. "Towards an economic theory of incentives in just-in-time manufacturing," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(3-4), pages 432-439, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:39:y:1995:i:3-4:p:432-439
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Jacques Crémer, 1995. "Arm's Length Relationships," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 110(2), pages 275-295.
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    Cited by:

    1. Harrigan, James & Venables, Tony, 2004. "Timeliness, trade and agglomeration," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 2300, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Yim, Andrew, 2010. "Quality Cost and Failure Risk in the Choice of Single versus Multiple Sourcing," MPRA Paper 27858, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Anne Chwolka, 2003. "Marktorientierte Zielkostenvorgaben als Instrument der Verhaltenssteuerung im Kostenmanagement," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 55(2), pages 135-157, March.
    4. Crosignani, Matteo & Macchiavelli, Marco & Silva, André F., 2023. "Pirates without borders: The propagation of cyberattacks through firms’ supply chains," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 147(2), pages 432-448.
    5. Christian Hofmann & Erik Hofmann & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2008. "Kontrollrechte und Anreize in Supply Chains," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 60(59), pages 1-29, January.
    6. Harrigan, James & Venables, Anthony J., 2006. "Timeliness and agglomeration," Journal of Urban Economics, Elsevier, vol. 59(2), pages 300-316, March.

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