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Comparative statics of the optimal dynamic incentive contract

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Author Info
Laffont, Jean-Jacques
Tirole, Jean

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File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V64-45JK4MV-G/2/08b9e0e9aa932c82abc6d6143a3aed3a
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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal European Economic Review.

Volume (Year): 31 (1987)
Issue (Month): 4 (June)
Pages: 901-926
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Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:31:y:1987:i:4:p:901-926

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  1. Marcelo Côrtes Neri & Marcelo Casal Xerez, 2004. "Aspectos Dinâmicos De Um Sistema De Metas Sociais," Anais do XXXII Encontro Nacional de Economia [Proceedings of the 32th Brazilian Economics Meeting] 055, ANPEC - Associação Nacional dos Centros de Pósgraduação em Economia [Brazilian Association of Graduate Programs in Economics]. [Downloadable!]
  2. Mikhail Drugov, 2006. "Information and Delay in an Agency Model," Economics Series Working Papers 298, University of Oxford, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  3. Neri, Marcelo Cortes & Xerez, Marcelo Casal de, 2004. "Aspectos dinâmicos de um sistema de metas sociais," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 563, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
  4. Marco Battaglini, 2003. "Long-Term Contracting with Markovian Consumers," Theory workshop papers 505798000000000048, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
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  5. Neri, Marcelo Cortes & Xerez, Marcelo Casal de, 2004. "Desenho de um sistema de metas sociais," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 565, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-3.

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