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Polarization and corruption in America

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  • Melki, Mickael
  • Pickering, Andrew

Abstract

Using panel data from the US states, we document a robust negative relationship between state-level government corruption and ideological polarization. This finding is sustained when state polarization is instrumented using lagged state neighbor ideology. We argue that polarization increases the expected costs of engaging in corruption, especially deterring marginal low-level corruption. Consistent with this thesis federal prosecutorial effort falls and case quality increases with polarization. Tangible anti-corruption measures including the stringency of state ethics’ laws and independent commissions for redistricting are also associated with increased state polarization.

Suggested Citation

  • Melki, Mickael & Pickering, Andrew, 2020. "Polarization and corruption in America," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 124(C).
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:eecrev:v:124:y:2020:i:c:s0014292120300295
    DOI: 10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103397
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    Cited by:

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Ideological polarization;

    JEL classification:

    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • H0 - Public Economics - - General

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