A note on Common Agency models of moral hazard
AbstractWe consider Common Agency games of moral hazard and we suggest that there is only a very weak support for the standard restriction to take-it or leave-it contracts.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 95 (2007)
Issue (Month): 2 (May)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 2004.
"Moral Hazard and Nonexclusive Contracts,"
RAND Journal of Economics,
The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 306-328, Summer.
- Bisin, Alberto & Guaitoli, Danilo, 1998. "Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts," CEPR Discussion Papers 1987, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Alberto Bisin & Danilo Guaitoli, 1998. "Moral hazard and non-exclusive contracts," Economics Working Papers 345, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
- Attar Andrea & Campioni Eloisa & Piaser Gwenael, 2006.
"Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market,"
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics,
De Gruyter, vol. 6(1), pages 1-35, October.
- ATTAR, Andrea & CAMPIONI, Eloisa & PIASER, Gwenaël, 2005. "Multiple lending and constrained efficiency in the credit market," CORE Discussion Papers 2005031, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
- Andrea Attar & Eloisa Campioni & Gwenäel Piaser, 2006. "Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market," Working Papers 2006_29, Department of Economics, University of Venice "Ca' Foscari".
- Andrea, ATTAR & Eloisa, CAMPIONI & Gwenaël, PIASER, 2005. "Multiple Lending and Constrained Efficiency in the Credit Market," Discussion Papers (ECON - DÃ©partement des Sciences Economiques) 2005024, Université catholique de Louvain, Département des Sciences Economiques.
- Peters, Michael, 2001.
"Common Agency and the Revelation Principle,"
Econometric Society, vol. 69(5), pages 1349-72, September.
- Anderson Robert M. & Zame William R., 2001. "Genericity with Infinitely Many Parameters," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 1(1), pages 1-64, February.
- Attar, Andrea & Piaser, Gwenael & Porteiro, Nicolas, 2007. "Negotiation and take-it or leave-it in common agency with non-contractible actions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 590-593, July.
- Christine A. Parlour & Uday Rajan, 2001. "Competition in Loan Contracts," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 91(5), pages 1311-1328, December.
- Michael Peters, 2000.
"Negotiation and Take it or Leave it in Common Agency,"
peters-00-02, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
- Peters, Michael, 2003. "Negotiation and take it or leave it in common agency," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 111(1), pages 88-109, July.
- Bernheim, B Douglas & Whinston, Michael D, 1986. "Common Agency," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(4), pages 923-42, July.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2002.
"The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games,"
Econometric Society, vol. 70(4), pages 1659-1673, July.
- David Martimort & Lars Stole, 2001. "The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games," CESifo Working Paper Series 575, CESifo Group Munich.
- Chassagnon, Arnold & Attar, Andrea, 2008. "On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts," Economics Papers from University Paris Dauphine 123456789/4717, Paris Dauphine University.
- Andrea Attar & Arnold Chassagnon, 2006.
"On moral hazard and nonexclusive contracts,"
PSE Working Papers
- Attar, Andrea & Majumdar, Dipjyoti & Piaser, Gwenaël & Porteiro, Nicolás, 2008. "Common agency games: Indifference and separable preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 56(1), pages 75-95, July.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Zhang, Lei).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.