Global environmental problems, efficiency and limited altruism
AbstractGlobal environmental problems are often assumed to imply extensive inefficiencies since there is no global authority corresponding to the government at a national level. This paper shows, on the contrary, that rich countries in a free unregulated market may still undertake globally efficient abatement investments, given the existence of limited nonpaternalistic altruism.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 86 (2005)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Johansson-Stenman, Olof, 2004. "Global environmental problems, efficiency and limited altruism," Working Papers in Economics 139, University of Gothenburg, Department of Economics.
- D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
- D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
- D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
- D64 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Altruism; Philanthropy
- Q20 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - General
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