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Asymmetric auction experiments with(out) commonly known beliefs

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  • Guth, Werner
  • Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta

Abstract

Are commonly known beliefs essential for bidding behavior in asymmetric auctions? Our experimental results suggest that not informing participants how values are randomly generated does not change behavior much and may even make it appear more rational.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 80 (2003)
Issue (Month): 2 (August)
Pages: 195-199

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:80:y:2003:i:2:p:195-199

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References

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  1. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
  2. Kagel, J.H. & Levin, D., 1988. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behavior In First, Second And Third-Price Auctions With Varying Numbers Of Bidders," Papers, Houston - Department of Economics 13, Houston - Department of Economics.
  3. Engelmann, Dirk & Strobel, Martin, 1999. "The false consensus effect disappears if representative information and monetary incentives are given," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 1999,66, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
  4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, 03.
  5. Plum, M, 1992. "Characterization and Computation of Nash-Equilibria for Auctions with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 20(4), pages 393-418.
  6. Maskin, Eric & Riley, John, 2000. "Asymmetric Auctions," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 67(3), pages 413-38, July.
  7. repec:wop:humbsf:2001-15 is not listed on IDEAS
  8. repec:wop:humbsf:2000-72 is not listed on IDEAS
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Cited by:
  1. Kirchkamp, Oliver & Poen, Eva & Rei, J. Philipp, 2009. "Outside options: Another reason to choose the first-price auction," European Economic Review, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 53(2), pages 153-169, February.
  2. Michalis Drouvelis & Wieland Muller & Alex Possajennikov, 2009. "Signaling Without Common Prior: An Experiment," Discussion Papers, Department of Economics, University of York 09/08, Department of Economics, University of York.
  3. Rodney Garratt & Mark Walker & John Wooders, 2012. "Behavior in second-price auctions by highly experienced eBay buyers and sellers," Experimental Economics, Springer, Springer, vol. 15(1), pages 44-57, March.
  4. Drouvelis, Michalis & Müller, Wieland & Possajennikov, Alex, 2012. "Signaling without a common prior: Results on experimental equilibrium selection," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 102-119.

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