Low and high types in asymmetric first-price auctions
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 75 (2002)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
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- Rene Kirkegaard, 2005. "A Simple Approach to Analyzing Asymmetric First Price Auctions," Working Papers, Brock University, Department of Economics 0504, Brock University, Department of Economics, revised Nov 2005.
- Yizhaq Minchuk, 2014. "Aggressive Bidding of Weak Bidders in All-Pay Auction," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 34(3), pages 1665-1668.
- Ãževket Alper KoÃ§, 2008. "Effects Of Asymmetry On Ex Ante Corruption At Auctions," Bogazici Journal of Economics and Administrative Sciences, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, Bogazici University, Department of Economics, vol. 22(1+2), pages 17-33.
- Yizhaq Minchuk, 2013. "Low and High Types of Bidders in Asymmetric Auctions with A General Utility Function," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 33(2), pages 1328-1332.
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