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Divisionalization in contests

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  • Huck, Steffen
  • Konrad, Kai A.
  • Muller, Wieland

Abstract

To be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest. --

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 70 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Pages: 89-93

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:70:y:2001:i:1:p:89-93

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References

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  1. Schoonbeek, Lambert, 1999. "A delegated agent in a winner-take-all contest," Research Report 99B47, University of Groningen, Research Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management).
  2. Skaperdas, Stergios, 1996. "Contest Success Functions," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 7(2), pages 283-90, February.
  3. Konrad, Kai A. & Peters, Wolfgang & Wärneryd, Karl, 1999. "Delegation in first-price all-pay auctions," Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 316, Stockholm School of Economics.
  4. Baye, Michael R & Crocker, Keith J & Ju, Jiandong, 1996. "Divisionalization, Franchising, and Divestiture Incentives in Oligopoly," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(1), pages 223-36, March.
  5. Gaudet, Gerard & Salant, Stephen W, 1991. "Increasing the Profits of a Subset of Firms in Oligopoly Models with Strategic Substitutes," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(3), pages 658-65, June.
  6. Baik, Kyung Hwan & Kim, In-Gyu, 1997. "Delegation in contests," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 281-298, May.
  7. Baye, Michael R & Kovenock, Dan & de Vries, Casper G, 1994. " The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game When R Is Greater Than 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 81(3-4), pages 363-80, December.
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Cited by:
  1. Oliver Gürtler, 2005. "A rationale for the coexistence of central and decentral marketing in team sports," Bonn Econ Discussion Papers bgse4_2005, University of Bonn, Germany.
  2. Bru, Lluís & de Haro, José-Manuel Ordóñez & Faulí-Oller, Ramon, 2001. "Divisionalization in Vertical Structures," CEPR Discussion Papers 3011, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  3. Joao Carlos Correia Leitao, 2004. "Optimal Divisionalization for Selling Networks of Cable Television Services," Industrial Organization 0403004, EconWPA.
  4. Amegashie, J.A. & Myers, G.M., 2003. "Financing Public Goods Via Lotteries," Working Papers 2003-1, University of Guelph, Department of Economics and Finance.
  5. Kai A. Konrad, 2005. "Silent Interests and All-Pay Auctions," CESifo Working Paper Series 1473, CESifo Group Munich.
  6. Oliver Gürtler, 2007. "A Rationale for the Coexistence of Central and Decentral Marketing in Team Sports," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 8, pages 89-106, 02.
  7. Oliver Gurtler & Matthias Krakel, 2003. "Who is declared dead lives longer," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 10(15), pages 995-997.
  8. Matthias Kräkel, 2004. "R&D spillovers and strategic delegation in oligopolistic contests," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 25(3), pages 147-156.

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