Divisionalization in contests
AbstractTo be represented by more than one contestant in a contest has advantages and disadvantages. This paper determines the conditions under which it is favorable to send several agents into the contest. --
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 70 (2001)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure and Pricing - - - Auctions
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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