Threat bargaining problems with correlated beliefs
Abstract
In this paper we provide a general framework for studying threat bargaining games with correlated beliefs. In this framework we obtain a characterization of the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution without any monotonicity assumption. The approach adds a dose of realism to the already existing literature on threat bargaining games.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 37 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (November)
Pages: 229-233
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Related research
Keywords:Other versions of this item:
- Lahiri Somdeb, . "Threat Bargaining Problems with Correlated Beliefs," IIMA Working Papers WP1991-06-01_01020, Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad, Research and Publication Department.
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