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Asymmetric bidding in second-price, common-value auctions

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  • Harstad, Ronald M.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 35 (1991)
Issue (Month): 3 (March)
Pages: 249-252

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:35:y:1991:i:3:p:249-252

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Cited by:
  1. Angel Hernando-Veciana, 2000. "Successful Uninformed Bidding," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0791, Econometric Society.
  2. Ricardo Gonçalves, 2008. "A communication equilibrium in English auctions with discrete bidding," Working Papers de Economia (Economics Working Papers) 042008, Faculdade de Economia e Gestão, Universidade Católica Portuguesa (Porto).
  3. Gonçalves, Ricardo, 2008. "Irrationality in English auctions," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 180-192, July.
  4. Ronald M. Harstad, 2005. "Rational Participation Revolutionizes Auction Theory," Working Papers 0518, Department of Economics, University of Missouri.
  5. Ronald M Harstad, 2011. "Endogenous Competition Alters the Structure of Optimal Auctions," ISER Discussion Paper 0816, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
  6. Vlad Mares & Ronald Harstad, 2007. "Ex-post full surplus extraction, straightforwardly," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 32(2), pages 399-410, August.
  7. Habib, Michel A. & Ziegler, Alexandre, 2007. "Why government bonds are sold by auction and corporate bonds by posted-price selling," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 343-367, July.
  8. Fernando Branco, 1996. "Common value auctions with independent types," Review of Economic Design, Springer, vol. 2(1), pages 283-309, December.
  9. Shahriar, Quazi & Wooders, John, 2011. "An experimental study of auctions with a buy price under private and common values," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 72(2), pages 558-573, June.

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