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On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector

Author

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  • Banerjee, Ritwik
  • Baul, Tushi
  • Rosenblat, Tanya

Abstract

Do corrupt people self select themselves in professions where the scope of corruption is high? We conduct a corruption experiment with private sector job aspirants and aspirants of Indian bureaucracy. The game models embezzlement of resources in which “supervisors” evaluate the performance of “workers” and then pay them. We find that aspirant bureaucrats indulge in more corruption than private sector aspirants but the likelihood of being corrupt is same across two sectors.

Suggested Citation

  • Banerjee, Ritwik & Baul, Tushi & Rosenblat, Tanya, 2015. "On self selection of the corrupt into the public sector," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 127(C), pages 43-46.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:127:y:2015:i:c:p:43-46
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2014.12.020
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    2. Brassiolo, Pablo & Estrada, Ricardo & Fajardo, Gustavo & Vargas, Juan, 2021. "Self-Selection into corruption: Evidence from the lab," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 192(C), pages 799-812.
    3. Ritwik Banerjee, 2016. "On the interpretation of bribery in a laboratory corruption game: moral frames and social norms," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 19(1), pages 240-267, March.
    4. Choudhury, Sanchari, 2023. "Non-random selection into entrepreneurship in the realm of government decentralization and corruption," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 78(C).
    5. Jordan Gans-Morse & Alexander S. Kalgin & Andrei V. Klimenko & Andrei A. Yakovlev, 2017. "Motivations for Public Service in Corrupt States: Evidence from Post-Soviet Russia," HSE Working papers WP BRP 13/PSP/2017, National Research University Higher School of Economics.
    6. Lucia Rizzica, 2016. "Why go public? A study of the individual determinants of public sector employment choice," Questioni di Economia e Finanza (Occasional Papers) 343, Bank of Italy, Economic Research and International Relations Area.
    7. Valasek, Justin, 2018. "Dynamic reform of public institutions: A model of motivated agents and collective reputation," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 168(C), pages 94-108.
    8. Lata Gangadharan & Tarun Jain & Pushkar Maitra & Joe Vecci, 2022. "Lab-in-the-field experiments: perspectives from research on gender," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 73(1), pages 31-59, January.
    9. Caliari, Daniele & Soraperra, Ivan, 2023. "Planning to cheat: Temptation and self-control," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Behavior SP II 2023-205, WZB Berlin Social Science Center.
    10. Kai A. Konrad & Tim Lohse & Sven A. Simon, 2021. "Pecunia non olet: on the self-selection into (dis)honest earning opportunities," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 24(4), pages 1105-1130, December.
    11. Donna Harris & Oana Borcan & Danila Serra & Henry Telli & Bruno Schettini & Stefan Dercon, 2022. "Proud to belong: The impact of ethics training on police officers," CSAE Working Paper Series 2022-05, Centre for the Study of African Economies, University of Oxford.
    12. Guido Friebel & Michael Kosfeld & Gerd Thielmann, 2019. "Trust the Police? Self-Selection of Motivated Agents into the German Police Force," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 11(4), pages 59-78, November.
    13. Guillermo Cruces & Martín A. Rossi & Ernesto Schargrodsky, 2023. "Dishonesty and Public Employment," American Economic Review: Insights, American Economic Association, vol. 5(4), pages 511-526, December.
    14. Ananish Chaudhuri & Vegard Iversen & Francesca R. Jensenius & Pushkar Maitra, 2020. "Selecting the Best of Us? Politician Quality in Village Councils in West Bengal, India," CESifo Working Paper Series 8597, CESifo.
    15. Gans-Morse, Jordan & Borges, Mariana & Makarin, Alexey & Mannah-Blankson, Theresa & Nickow, Andre & Zhang, Dong, 2018. "Reducing bureaucratic corruption: Interdisciplinary perspectives on what works," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 105(C), pages 171-188.
    16. Frederico Finan & Benjamin A. Olken & Rohini Pande, 2015. "The Personnel Economics of the State," NBER Working Papers 21825, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    17. Hoffmann, Lisa, 2023. "(Ch)eating for oneself or cheating for others? Experimental evidence from young politicians and students in Kenya," OSF Preprints xnez5, Center for Open Science.
    18. Vranka, Marek & Hudík, Marek & Frollová, Nikola & Bahník, Štěpán & Sýkorová, Markéta & Houdek, Petr, 2021. "Honesty of online workers: A field experiment shows no evidence of self-selection of cheaters to a cheating-enabling work environment," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics (formerly The Journal of Socio-Economics), Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    19. Mocetti, Sauro & Orlando, Tommaso, 2019. "Corruption, workforce selection and mismatch in the public sector," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 60(C).
    20. Petr Houdek & Štěpán Bahník & Marek Hudík & Marek Vranka, 2021. "Selection effects on dishonest behavior," Judgment and Decision Making, Society for Judgment and Decision Making, vol. 16(2), pages 238-266, March.
    21. repec:cup:judgdm:v:16:y:2021:i:2:p:238-266 is not listed on IDEAS
    22. Sebastian Kot & Róbert Štefko & Ján Dobrovič & Rastislav Rajnoha & Jan Váchal, 2019. "The Main Performance and Effectiveness Factors of Sustainable Financial Administration Reform Using Multidimensional Statistical Tools," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 11(13), pages 1-21, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Corruption; Experiments; Bureaucracy;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption
    • O12 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - Microeconomic Analyses of Economic Development
    • K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law

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