Quality cut-offs in procurement auctions
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DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.07.020
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References listed on IDEAS
- Yeon-Koo Che, 1993.
"Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions,"
RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 24(4), pages 668-680, Winter.
- Che, Y.K., 1991. "Design Competition through Multidimensional Auctions," Working papers 9123, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
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Cited by:
- Jiancai Pi, 2021. "An investigation of seeming favoritism in public procurement," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 89(1), pages 128-137, January.
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More about this item
Keywords
Procurement; Auction; Minimum quality;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
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