Do financial advisor commissions distort client choice?
AbstractThis experiment shows that varying the commission received by financial advisors strongly influences insurance purchase.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 119 (2013)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Commission selling; Financial advisor; Consumer bias;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G02 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Behavioral Finance: Underlying Principles
- G1 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets
- G11 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Portfolio Choice; Investment Decisions
- G2 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services
- G23 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Non-bank Financial Institutions; Financial Instruments; Institutional Investors
- G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Daniel Bergstresser & John M. R. Chalmers & Peter Tufano, 2009. "Assessing the Costs and Benefits of Brokers in the Mutual Fund Industry," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 22(10), pages 4129-4156, October.
- Roman Inderst & Marco Ottaviani, 2009. "Misselling through Agents," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 99(3), pages 883-908, June.
- Utpal Bhattacharya & Andreas Hackethal & Simon Kaesler & Benjamin Loos & Steffen Meyer, 2012. "Is Unbiased Financial Advice to Retail Investors Sufficient? Answers from a Large Field Study," Review of Financial Studies, Society for Financial Studies, vol. 25(4), pages 975-1032.
- Sendhil Mullainathan & Markus Noeth & Antoinette Schoar, 2012. "The Market for Financial Advice: An Audit Study," NBER Working Papers 17929, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Susan E. K. Christoffersen & Richard Evans & David K. Musto, 2013. "What Do Consumers’ Fund Flows Maximize? Evidence from Their Brokers’ Incentives," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 68(1), pages 201-235, 02.
- John Chalmers & Jonathan Reuter, 2012. "What is the Impact of Financial Advisors on Retirement Portfolio Choices and Outcomes?," NBER Working Papers 18158, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2011. "When Sunlight Fails to Disinfect: Understanding the Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest," Journal of Consumer Research, University of Chicago Press, vol. 37(5), pages 836 - 857.
- Daylian M. Cain & George Loewenstein & Don A. Moore, 2005. "The Dirt on Coming Clean: Perverse Effects of Disclosing Conflicts of Interest," The Journal of Legal Studies, University of Chicago Press, vol. 34(1), pages 1-25, 01.
- Inderst, Roman, 2010. "Misselling (financial) products: The limits for internal compliance," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 35-37, January.
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