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Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc

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  • Öztürk, Murat
  • Peters, Hans
  • Storcken, Ton

Abstract

In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 119 (2013)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 14-16

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:14-16

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Related research

Keywords: Single-dipped preferences; Strategy-proofness; Noxious facilities;

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  1. Kunreuther, Howard & Kleindorfer, Paul R, 1986. "A Sealed-Bid Auction Mechanism for Siting Noxious Facilities," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 295-99, May.
  2. Murat Öztürk & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2014. "On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 83-108, May.
  3. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & and Bernardo Moreno, 2009. "Domains, Ranges and Strategy-Proofness: The Case of Single-dipped Preferences," Working Papers 418, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
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Cited by:
  1. Walter Bossert & Hans Peters, 2013. "Single-Basined Choice," Cahiers de recherche, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ 04-2013, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
  2. Murat Öztürk & Hans Peters & Ton Storcken, 2014. "On the location of public bads: strategy-proofness under two-dimensional single-dipped preferences," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 56(1), pages 83-108, May.

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