IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/ecolet/v118y2013i2p385-388.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Market financing of bail-out targets

Author

Listed:
  • Pérez Montes, Carlos

Abstract

A bank that needs a public bail-out to avoid liquidation can use financial contracts to provide contingent liquidation rights to investors and force the government to increase public support. Limiting the size of the bail-out before knowing the bank’s financial condition decreases welfare if the government is strongly pro-continuation.

Suggested Citation

  • Pérez Montes, Carlos, 2013. "Market financing of bail-out targets," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 118(2), pages 385-388.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:385-388
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.003
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512006398
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.003?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Mr. Burkhard Drees & Ceyla Pazarbasioglu, 1995. "The Nordic Banking Crises: Pitfalls in Financial Liberalization?," IMF Working Papers 1995/061, International Monetary Fund.
    2. Philippe Aghion & Patrick Bolton, 1992. "An Incomplete Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 59(3), pages 473-494.
    3. Mathias Dewatripont & Jean Tirole, 1994. "A Theory of Debt and Equity: Diversity of Securities and Manager-Shareholder Congruence," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1027-1054.
    4. Erik Berglöf & Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden, 1994. "Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital Structure with Multiple Investors," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 109(4), pages 1055-1084.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Becht, Marco & Bolton, Patrick & Roell, Ailsa, 2003. "Corporate governance and control," Handbook of the Economics of Finance, in: G.M. Constantinides & M. Harris & R. M. Stulz (ed.), Handbook of the Economics of Finance, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 1, pages 1-109, Elsevier.
    2. Arping, Stefan, 2005. "Protective interests and creative destruction," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 14(4), pages 401-431, October.
    3. Anderson, Ronald W. & Nyborg, Kjell G., 2011. "Financing and corporate growth under repeated moral hazard," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 20(1), pages 1-24, January.
    4. Mathias Dewatripont & Patrick Legros & Steven A. Matthews, 2003. "Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics," Journal of the European Economic Association, MIT Press, vol. 1(4), pages 890-930, June.
    5. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1997. "A Survey of Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 52(2), pages 737-783, June.
    6. Nuri Ersahin & Rustom M. Irani & Hanh Le, 2015. "Creditor Control Rights and Resource Allocation within Firms," Working Papers 15-39, Center for Economic Studies, U.S. Census Bureau.
    7. Oliver Hart, 2001. "Financial Contracting," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1079-1100, December.
    8. M. M. Buehlmaier, Matthias, 2014. "Debt, equity, and information," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 54-62.
    9. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 2000. "Optimal financial contracts for large investors: the role of lender liability," Working Papers 00-1, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    10. Guembel, Alexander & White, Lucy, 2014. "Good cop, bad cop: Complementarities between debt and equity in disciplining management," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 23(4), pages 541-569.
    11. Tan, Liang, 2013. "Creditor control rights, state of nature verification, and financial reporting conservatism," Journal of Accounting and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 55(1), pages 1-22.
    12. Berlin, Mitchell & Mester, Loretta J., 2001. "Lender Liability and Large Investors," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 108-137, April.
    13. Mitchell Berlin & Loretta J. Mester, 1999. "Financial contracts and the legal treatment of informed investors," Working Papers 99-8, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    14. Freudenberg, Felix & Imbierowicz, Björn & Saunders, Anthony & Steffen, Sascha, 2017. "Covenant violations and dynamic loan contracting," Journal of Corporate Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 540-565.
    15. Lee, Edward & Pappas, Kostas & Xu, Alice Liang, 2020. "Foreign Lenders’ adoption of performance pricing provisions in syndicated loans," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 118(C).
    16. Dewatripont, Mathias & Tirole, Jean, 1996. "Biased principals as a discipline device," Japan and the World Economy, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 195-206, June.
    17. Kang, Yeongjae, 1997. "Expropriation Risk, Governance Control and Equilibrium Financial Contract," SSE/EFI Working Paper Series in Economics and Finance 166, Stockholm School of Economics.
    18. Marianna Succurro, 2008. "Bankruptcy Systems And Economic Performance Across Contries: Some Empirical Evidence," Working Papers 200801, Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF.
    19. Roberts, Michael R. & Sufi, Amir, 2009. "Renegotiation of financial contracts: Evidence from private credit agreements," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 159-184, August.
    20. Chong-En Bai & Zhigang Tao & Changqi Wu, 2004. "Revenue Sharing and Control Rights in Team Production: Theories and Evidence from Joint Ventures," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 35(2), pages 277-305, Summer.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bank bail-out; Capital structure; Control rights;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
    • D60 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - General

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:385-388. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.