Scale economies, consistent conjectures and teams
AbstractThis paper models the behavior of team members in a consistent conjectures equilibrium. When subject to scale economies, team members produce more than Nash and when subject to scale diseconomies, they produce less than Nash. Moreover, even when effort levels of team members are perfect substitutes in production, they can be strategic complements in the face of scale economies. Finally, with sufficient scale economies, the complementarity eliminates free-riding and the team optimum is obtained.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 117 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Team production; Scale economies; Consistent conjectures;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D20 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - General
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