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The assortative matching scheme in a survival battle

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  • Aloni, Elad
  • Sela, Aner
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    Abstract

    We consider a battle between two groups D (defenders) and A (attackers). Each group has the same number of agents, but they differ by their abilities. Every agent confronts only one opponent from the other group once in either an all-pay contest or a Tullock contest such that the number of the contests is identical to the number of the agents in each group. The object of group D is to win all the contests in order to survive, or else it will be defeated by group A. We analyze the optimal matching scheme for group D and show that the assortative matching scheme, in which the two agents with the highest ability from each group confront each other, the two agents with the second highest ability from each group confront each other, and so on, is the optimal matching scheme for maximizing group D’s probability to survive the battle.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 117 (2012)
    Issue (Month): 1 ()
    Pages: 272-275

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:272-275

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

    Related research

    Keywords: Tullock contests; All-pay auctions; Assortative matching;

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    References

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    1. Konrad, Kai A., 2009. "Strategy and Dynamics in Contests," OUP Catalogue, Oxford University Press, number 9780199549603.
    2. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
    3. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
    4. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Vries, C., 1992. "The All-Pay Auction with Complete Information," Papers 8-92-1, Pennsylvania State - Department of Economics.
    5. Dan Kovenock & Brian Roberson, 2010. "The Optimal Defense of Networks of Targets," Purdue University Economics Working Papers 1251, Purdue University, Department of Economics.
    6. Klumpp, Tilman & Polborn, Mattias K., 2006. "Primaries and the New Hampshire Effect," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 90(6-7), pages 1073-1114, August.
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