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Voracity, growth, and welfare

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  • Fujiwara, Kenji

Abstract

This paper explores some implications of the comparison between feedback Nash and Stackelberg equilibria for growth and welfare in a ‘voracity’ model. We show that, as compared to the Nash equilibrium, the Stackelberg equilibrium involves a lower growth rate, while it leaves both the leaders and the followers better off, i.e., the Stackelberg equilibrium is Pareto superior to the Nash equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Fujiwara, Kenji, 2012. "Voracity, growth, and welfare," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 116(1), pages 11-14.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:11-14
    DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.092
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Tornell, Aaron, 1999. "Voracity and growth in discrete time," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 62(1), pages 139-145, January.
    2. Robert J. Barro & Xavier Sala-i-Martin, 2003. "Economic Growth, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 2, volume 1, number 0262025531, December.
    3. Tornell, Aaron & Velasco, Andes, 1992. "The Tragedy of the Commons and Economic Growth: Why Does Capital Flow from Poor to Rich Countries?," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(6), pages 1208-1231, December.
    4. Mino, Kazuo, 2006. "Voracity vs. Scale Effect in a Growing Economy," MPRA Paper 16999, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Dockner, Engelbert J. & Nishimura, Kazuo, 2005. "Capital accumulation games with a non-concave production function," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 57(4), pages 408-420, August.
    6. Robert J. Barro & Rachel McCleary, 2003. "Religion and Economic Growth," NBER Working Papers 9682, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    7. Shimomura, Koji, 1991. "The feedback equilibria of a differential game of capitalism," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 317-338, April.
    8. Lancaster, Kelvin, 1973. "The Dynamic Inefficiency of Capitalism," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 81(5), pages 1092-1109, Sept.-Oct.
    9. Mino, Kazuo, 2006. "Voracity vs. scale effect in a growing economy without secure property rights," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 93(2), pages 278-284, November.
    10. Philip R. Lane & Aaron Tornell, 1999. "The Voracity Effect," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 22-46, March.
    11. D. Vencatachellum, 1998. "A Differential R&D Game: Implications for Knowledge-Based Growth Models," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 96(1), pages 175-189, January.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Dynamic game; Growth; Welfare; Feedback Nash equilibrium; Feedback Stackelberg equilibrium;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
    • O41 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Growth and Aggregate Productivity - - - One, Two, and Multisector Growth Models

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