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Can industry regulators learn collusion structures from information-efficient asset markets?

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  • Zimper, Alexander
  • Hassan, Shakill

Abstract

This note combines a dynamic industrial organization model, in which an industry is subject to exogenous processes of market-size and collusion structure, with a consumption-based asset pricing model for the shares in the industry’s firms. Three main findings emerge for our model under the assumption of information-efficient asset markets. First, the volatility of a firm’s share price is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry’s market-size. Second, the volatility of a firm’s price-dividend ratio is exclusively driven by the volatility of the industry’s collusion structure whereby high (resp. low) ratios indicate less (resp. more) collusion. Third, for non-volatile collusion structures the price-dividend ratio is constant across different collusion structures.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 116 (2012)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-4

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:116:y:2012:i:1:p:1-4

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

Related research

Keywords: Cournot interaction; Collusion; Price-dividend ratio; Consumption-based asset pricing;

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  1. Bester, H. & Petrakis, E., 1991. "The Incentives for Cost Reduction in a Differentiated Industry," Discussion Paper 1991-36, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  2. Bolotova, Yuliya & Connor, John M. & Miller, Douglas J., 2008. "The impact of collusion on price behavior: Empirical results from two recent cases," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 26(6), pages 1290-1307, November.
  3. Mehra, Rajnish & Prescott, Edward C., 1985. "The equity premium: A puzzle," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 145-161, March.
  4. Lucas, Robert E, Jr, 1978. "Asset Prices in an Exchange Economy," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 46(6), pages 1429-45, November.
  5. Bonanno, Giacomo & Haworth, Barry, 1998. "Intensity of competition and the choice between product and process innovation," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 495-510, July.
  6. Jean Tirole, 1988. "The Theory of Industrial Organization," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262200716, January.
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