An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases
AbstractGreenhouse gas emissions build up an atmospheric stock which depreciates over time. We identify weakly renegotiation-proof equilibria with full participation in a game of international emission reduction. Treaties are easier to reach for long-lived than for short-lived gases.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 115 (2012)
Issue (Month): 3 ()
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Global warming; International agreement; Weak renegotiation-proofness;
Other versions of this item:
- Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot & Stegemann, Ulrike, 2011. "An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases," Economics Department Working Paper Series 11, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
- Kratzsch, Uwe & Sieg, Gernot & Stegemann, Ulrike, 2011. "An international agreement with full participation to tackle the stock of greenhouse gases," MPRA Paper 31977, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Q54 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Climate; Natural Disasters
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations, National Security, and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
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