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Implementation of individually rational social choice functions with guaranteed utilities

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  • Mealem, Yosef
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    Abstract

    A simple mechanism is presented that allocates an indivisible object between two agents for almost any possible compensation rule. Furthermore, the equilibrium strategy guarantees a level of utility not less than -[epsilon], where [epsilon] can be arbitrarily small.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 112 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 2 (August)
    Pages: 165-167

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:112:y:2011:i:2:p:165-167

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

    Related research

    Keywords: Indivisible object Individual rationality Guaranteed utility;

    References

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    1. Maskin, Eric & Moore, John, 1999. "Implementation and Renegotiation," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 66(1), pages 39-56, January.
    2. Mutuswami, Suresh & Winter, Eyal, 2004. "Efficient mechanisms for multiple public goods," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 88(3-4), pages 629-644, March.
    3. Crawford, V. P. & Heller, W. P., 1979. "Fair division with indivisible commodities," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 10-27, August.
    4. MANIQUET, François, . "Implementation of allocation rules under perfect information," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1734, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    5. Moore, John & Repullo, Rafael, 1988. "Subgame Perfect Implementation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1191-1220, September.
    6. Salvador Barbera, 1995. "Strategy-Proof Allotment Rules," Discussion Papers 1142, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    7. Moulin, Herve, 1981. "Implementing just and efficient decision-making," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(2), pages 193-213, October.
    8. Bag, Parimal Kanti, 1997. "Public Goods Provision: Applying Jackson-Moulin Mechanism for Restricted Agent Characteristics," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 460-472, April.
    9. Kahana, Nava & Mealem, Yosef & Nitzan, Shmuel, 2008. "A complete implementation of the efficient allocation of pollution," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 142-144, November.
    10. Mealem, Yosef, 2010. "Efficient provision of a public project (almost) without knowing the cost-sharing rule," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 107(2), pages 194-197, May.
    11. Abreu, Dilip & Sen, Arunava, 1990. "Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 50(2), pages 285-299, April.
    12. Yan Yu, 2006. "Public Goods Provision: On Generalizing the Jackson-Moulin Mechanism," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 8(1), pages 49-60, 01.
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