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Can experimental measures of sensitivity to social pressure predict public good contribution?

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Author Info

  • Zizzo, Daniel John
  • Fleming, Piers

Abstract

Public good contributions may be affected by the social demand to contribute that is implicit in them. Sensitivity to social pressure predicts behavior in paired dictator and money burning games; the evidence for effects on public good contribution is mixed.

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

Volume (Year): 111 (2011)
Issue (Month): 3 (June)
Pages: 239-242

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Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:111:y:2011:i:3:p:239-242

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

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Keywords: Social pressure Experimenter demand effects Public goods;

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References

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  1. Daniel Zizzo, 2010. "Experimenter demand effects in economic experiments," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 75-98, March.
  2. David Masclet & Charles Noussair & Steven Tucker & Marie-Claire Villeval, 2003. "Monetary and Nonmonetary Punishment in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 93(1), pages 366-380, March.
  3. John A. List, 2007. "On the Interpretation of Giving in Dictator Games," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 115, pages 482-493.
  4. Nicholas Bardsley, 2008. "Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?," Experimental Economics, Springer, vol. 11(2), pages 122-133, June.
  5. Zizzo, Daniel John, 2003. "Money burning and rank egalitarianism with random dictators," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 81(2), pages 263-266, November.
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Cited by:
  1. Zizzo, Daniel John, 2013. "Claims and confounds in economic experiments," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 186-195.
  2. Zhang, Zhaoguo & Jin, Xiaocui & Yang, Qingxiang & Zhang, Yi, 2013. "An empirical study on the institutional factors of energy conservation and emissions reduction: Evidence from listed companies in China," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 57(C), pages 36-42.
  3. Le Zhang & Andreas Ortmann, 2012. "On the Interpretation of Giving, Taking, and Destruction in Dictator Games and Joy-of-Destruction Games," Discussion Papers 2012-50, School of Economics, The University of New South Wales.

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