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Subsidization to induce tipping

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  • Shafran, Aric P.
  • Lepore, Jason J.
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    Abstract

    In binary choice games with strategic complementarities and multiple equilibria, we characterize the minimal cost subsidy program to guarantee agents play the Pareto optimal equilibrium. These subsidies are generally asymmetric, whether or not agents are identical and even if private values are anonymous.

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    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/B6V84-517BB1D-5/2/574b139329efc78d7634ee3946512a3b
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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.

    Volume (Year): 110 (2011)
    Issue (Month): 1 (January)
    Pages: 32-35

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    Handle: RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:110:y:2011:i:1:p:32-35

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    Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet

    Related research

    Keywords: Coordination failure Strategic complementarities Tipping;

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    1. Costas Azariadis, 1996. "The Economics of Poverty Traps Part One: Complete Markets," Working Papers 9606, Centro de Investigacion Economica, ITAM.
    2. Cornes, Richard, 1993. "Dyke Maintenance and Other Stories: Some Neglected Types of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 108(1), pages 259-71, February.
    3. Geoffrey Heal & Howard Kunreuther, 2007. "Social Reinforcement: Cascades, Entrapment and Tipping," NBER Working Papers 13579, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    4. Kunreuther, Howard & Heal, Geoffrey, 2003. " Interdependent Security," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 26(2-3), pages 231-49, March-May.
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