A note on the pricing of IPOs
AbstractThis paper studies the pricing of IPOs in a tractable model in which an investment bank faces some investors with superior information. We show how this can lead to underpricing and we make a number of empirical predictions.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 106 (2010)
Issue (Month): 2 (February)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
IPO underpricing Monopoly pricing Fixed-price auction Risk aversion;
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Maskin, Eric, 1987. "Monopoly with asymmetric information about quality : Behavior and regulation," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 31(1-2), pages 483-489.
- Rock, Kevin, 1986. "Why new issues are underpriced," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(1-2), pages 187-212.
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