The miracle as a randomization device: A lesson from Richard Wagner's romantic opera Tannhäuser und der Sängerkrieg auf Wartburg
AbstractIn this paper we examine the strategic savviness of the medieval church as portrayed in Richard Wagner's Tannhäuser. We show that the church employed an optimal randomization strategy based on arguments of dominance or trembling-hand perfection. Particular attention is paid to the employed randomization device.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 102 (2009)
Issue (Month): 1 (January)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Crime and punishment Sins and absolution Richard Wagner Tannhäuser Trembling-hand perfection Optimal randomization;
Other versions of this item:
- Harmgart, H. & Huck, S. & Müller, W., 2006. "The Miracle as Randomization Device: A Lesson from Richard Wagner's Romantic Opera Tannhauser und der Sangerkrieg auf Wartburg," Discussion Paper 2006-006, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Harmgart, H. & Huck, S. & Müller, W., 2009. "The miracle as a randomization device: A lesson from Richard Wagner's romantic opera "Tannhauser und der Sanggerkrieg auf Wartburg"," Open Access publications from Tilburg University urn:nbn:nl:ui:12-3159309, Tilburg University.
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