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Competing or cooperating to host mega events: A simple model

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  • Sheng, Li

Abstract

Using game theory tools, this paper analyzes strategic interactions between two candidate countries in bidding for the hosting rights for a certain mega event. The dynamic modeling reveals that competition may lead to an inefficient Nash-equilibrium, indicating welfare loss for both parties. Using a concrete version of a differential game function, and from the aspect of total benefit maximization that is Pareto-efficient, the paper derives an explicit solution to the game. The model developed has both practical relevance to policy makers and theoretical potential to be applied to other kinds of international biddings.

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  • Sheng, Li, 2010. "Competing or cooperating to host mega events: A simple model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(1), pages 375-379, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:ecmode:v:27:y:2010:i:1:p:375-379
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    Cited by:

    1. Sheng, Li, 2011. "Taxing tourism and subsidizing non-tourism: A welfare-enhancing solution to “Dutch disease”?," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1223-1228.
    2. Li Sheng, 2014. "The Effects of Foreign Expansion on Local Growth: The Case of Macao," European Planning Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 22(8), pages 1735-1743, August.
    3. Li Sheng, 2011. "Regional Competition and Sustainable Development: A Game Theory Model for Tourism Destinations," European Planning Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 19(4), pages 669-681, April.
    4. Sheng, Li, 2011. "Specialisation versus diversification: A simple model for tourist cities," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 32(5), pages 1229-1231.
    5. Keirstead, James, 2013. "Benchmarking urban energy efficiency in the UK," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 63(C), pages 575-587.
    6. Gu, Xinhua & Li, Guoqiang & Chang, Xiao & Guo, Haizhen, 2017. "Casino tourism, economic inequality, and housing bubbles," Tourism Management, Elsevier, vol. 62(C), pages 253-263.

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