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Interbank markets and bank bailout policies amid a sovereign debt crisis

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  • Lakdawala, Aeimit
  • Minetti, Raoul
  • Olivero, María Pía

Abstract

Interbank markets have been at the core of the international transmission of recent financial crises, including the euro area sovereign debt crisis. This paper studies the transmission of shocks in a two-country DSGE model where government bonds are used as collateral in interbank markets. We isolate an “interbank collateral channel” of transmission, which works through banks portfolio allocation between loans and government bonds, the resulting value of banks bond holdings and the tightness of collateral constraints in the interbank market. We find that, while in some scenarios this channel compounds a “bank net worth channel” in amplifying negative shocks, in other scenarios the “interbank collateral channel” can mitigate the effects of shocks. Bank bailout policies financed by government debt can erode this stabilizing effect.

Suggested Citation

  • Lakdawala, Aeimit & Minetti, Raoul & Olivero, María Pía, 2018. "Interbank markets and bank bailout policies amid a sovereign debt crisis," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 93(C), pages 131-153.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:dyncon:v:93:y:2018:i:c:p:131-153
    DOI: 10.1016/j.jedc.2018.01.035
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    Cited by:

    1. Auray, Stéphane & Eyquem, Aurélien & Ma, Xiaofei, 2018. "Banks, sovereign risk and unconventional monetary policies," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 108(C), pages 153-171.
    2. Luigi Marattin & Simone Meraglia & Raoul Minetti, 2022. "Sovereign bail‐outs and fiscal rules in a banking union," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 124(4), pages 1024-1055, October.
    3. Marco Di Pietro & Luigi Marattin & Raoul Minetti, 2021. "Public debt, sovereign spreads and the unpleasant arithmetic of fiscal consolidations," International Finance, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 24(2), pages 155-178, August.
    4. Cao, Qingqing & Minetti, Raoul & Olivero, Maria, 2018. "No Pain, No Gain. Multinational Banks in the Business Cycle," School of Economics Working Paper Series 2018-6, LeBow College of Business, Drexel University.
    5. Darracq Pariès, Matthieu & Müller, Georg & Papadopoulou, Niki, 2023. "Fiscal multipliers within the euro area in the context of sovereign risk and bank fragility," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    6. Qingqing Cao, 2018. "No Pain, No Gain. Multinational Banks in the Business Cycle," 2018 Meeting Papers 1059, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    7. Minetti, Raoul & Cao, Qingqing & Di Pietro, Marco & Kokas, Sotirios, 2020. "Bank Due Diligence in the Business Cycle," Working Papers 2020-3, Michigan State University, Department of Economics, revised 11 May 2020.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Sovereign debt; Credit crunch; Interbank markets; International contagion;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
    • E44 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Financial Markets and the Macroeconomy
    • F44 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Business Cycles

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