Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets
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Bibliographic Info
Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.
Volume (Year): 79 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 398-412
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec
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References listed on IDEASPlease report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.Cited by:
- Swinnen, Jo & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2007. "Contracting, competition, and rent distribution in commodity value chains," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/120365, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Andreas Madestam, 2009.
"Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders,"
Working Papers
2009.69, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Andreas Madestam, 2008. "Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders," Working Papers 347, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
- Swinnen, Jo & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2009.
"Rich consumers and poor producers: quality and rent distribution in global value chains,"
Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven
urn:hdl:123456789/255644, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Johan Swinnen & Anneleen Vandeplas, 2012. "Rich Consumers and Poor Producers: Quality and Rent Distribution in Global Value Chains," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 2.
- Swinnen, Jo & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2011. "Rich Consumers and Poor Producers: Quality and Rent Distribution in Global Value Chains," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/349337, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
- Swinnen, Johan F.M. & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2009. "Rich consumers and poor producers: Quality and rent distribution in global value chains," IFPRI discussion papers 932, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
- Foellmi, Reto & Oechslin, Manuel, 2008. "Why progressive redistribution can hurt the poor," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 738-747, April.
- Ghatak, Maitreesh & de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo, 2013.
"Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Micro Finance,"
CAGE Online Working Paper Series
122, Competitive Advantage in the Global Economy (CAGE).
- de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2012. "Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance," CEPR Discussion Papers 9165, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Johan F.M. Swinnen & Anneleen Vandeplas, 2007. "Vertical coordination, rent distribution, and development," LICOS Discussion Papers 18407, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
- Marina Halac, 2012. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 750-79, April.
- Swinnen, Johan F.M. & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2007. "Contracting, Competition, and Rent Distribution Theory and Empirical Evidence from Developing and Transition Countries," 103rd Seminar, April 23-25, 2007, Barcelona, Spain 9413, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
- Swinnen, Jo & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2007. "Quality, contracting and competition," Open Access publications from Katholieke Universiteit Leuven urn:hdl:123456789/241602, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven.
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