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Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets

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  • Genicot, Garance
  • Ray, Debraj

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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 79 (2006)
Issue (Month): 2 (April)
Pages: 398-412

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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:79:y:2006:i:2:p:398-412

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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/devec

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  1. Bardhan, Pranab K, 1983. "Labor-Tying in a Poor Agrarian Economy: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 98(3), pages 501-14, August.
  2. Grossman, Sanford J. & Hart, Oliver D., 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Scholarly Articles 3450060, Harvard University Department of Economics.
  3. Anindita Mukherjee & Debraj Ray, 1992. "Labor Tying," Boston University - Institute for Economic Development 29, Boston University, Institute for Economic Development.
  4. Hart, Oliver & Moore, John, 1990. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 98(6), pages 1119-58, December.
  5. Mansuri, Ghazala, 2007. "Credit layering in informal financial markets," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 715-730, November.
  6. Banerjee, Abhijit V. & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2004. "Eviction threats and investment incentives," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(2), pages 469-488, August.
  7. Kranton, Rachel E. & Swamy, Anand V., 1999. "The hazards of piecemeal reform: british civil courts and the credit market in colonial India," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 1-24, February.
  8. Dilip Mookherjee & Debraj Ray, 2002. "Contractual Structure and Wealth Accumulation," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(4), pages 818-849, September.
  9. Eswaran, Mukesh & Kotwal, Ashok, 1985. "A Theory of Two-Tier Labor Markets in Agrarian Economies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(1), pages 162-77, March.
  10. Diamond, Peter A., 1971. "A model of price adjustment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 3(2), pages 156-168, June.
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Cited by:
  1. Ulf von Lilienfeld-Toal & Dilip Mookherjee, 2010. "The Political Economy of Debt Bondage," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 2(3), pages 44-84, August.
  2. Swinnen, Johan F.M. & Vandeplas, Anneleen, 2007. "Contracting, Competition, and Rent Distribution Theory and Empirical Evidence from Developing and Transition Countries," 103rd Seminar, April 23-25, 2007, Barcelona, Spain 9413, European Association of Agricultural Economists.
  3. de Quidt, Jonathan & Fetzer, Thiemo & Ghatak, Maitreesh, 2012. "Market Structure and Borrower Welfare in Microfinance," CEPR Discussion Papers 9165, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Foellmi, Reto & Oechslin, Manuel, 2008. "Why progressive redistribution can hurt the poor," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(3-4), pages 738-747, April.
  5. David A. Miller & Joel Watson, 2013. "A Theory of Disagreement in Repeated Games With Bargaining," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 81(6), pages 2303-2350, November.
  6. Andreas Madestam, 2008. "Informal Finance: A Theory of Moneylenders," Working Papers 347, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University.
  7. Johan F.M. Swinnen & Anneleen Vandeplas, 2007. "Vertical coordination, rent distribution, and development," LICOS Discussion Papers 18407, LICOS - Centre for Institutions and Economic Performance, KU Leuven.
  8. Li Sanxi & Yao Dongmin & Xiao Hao, 2013. "Contract Bargaining with a Risk-Averse Agent," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 285-301, November.
  9. Swinnen Johan & Vandeplas Anneleen, 2012. "Rich Consumers and Poor Producers: Quality and Rent Distribution in Global Value Chains," Journal of Globalization and Development, De Gruyter, vol. 2(2), pages 1-30, January.
  10. Marina Halac, 2012. "Relational Contracts and the Value of Relationships," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 102(2), pages 750-79, April.

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