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Externalities, incentives, and failure to achieve national objectives in decentralized economies

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Author Info
Aizenman, Joshua
Isard, Peter

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Article provided by Elsevier in its journal Journal of Development Economics.

Volume (Year): 41 (1993)
Issue (Month): 1 (June)
Pages: 95-114
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Handle: RePEc:eee:deveco:v:41:y:1993:i:1:p:95-114

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Mario I. Bléjer & David Burton & Steven Vincent Dunaway & Gyorgy Szapary, 1991. "China: Economic Reform and Macroeconomic Management," IMF Occasional Papers 76, International Monetary Fund.
  2. Michael Bruno, 1989. "Economic Analysis and the Political Economy of Policy Formation," NBER Working Papers 3183, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Claudio E. V. Borio, 1990. "Financial arrangements, 'soft' budget constraints and inflation: lessons from the Yugoslav experience," BIS Working Papers 15, Bank for International Settlements. [Downloadable!]
  4. Aizenman, Joshua, 1989. "Country Risk, Incomplete Information and Taxes on International Borrowing," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 99(394), pages 147-61, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Kornai, J, 1979. "Resource-Constrained versus Demand-Constrained Systems," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(4), pages 801-19, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  1. Sebastian M. Saiegh & Mariano Tommasi, 1999. "Why is Argentina’s Fiscal Federalism so Inefficient? Entering the Labyrinth," Journal of Applied Economics, Universidad del CEMA, vol. 0, pages 169-209, May. [Downloadable!]
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