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Learning-by-Doing, Organizational Forgetting, and Industry Dynamics

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  • David Besanko
  • Ulrich Doraszelski
  • Yaroslav Kryukov
  • Mark Satterthwaite
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    Abstract

    Learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting are empirically important in a variety of industrial settings. This paper provides a general model of dynamic competition that accounts for these fundamentals and shows how they shape industry structure and dynamics. We show that forgetting does not simply negate learning. Rather, they are distinct economic forces that interact in subtle ways to produce a great variety of pricing behaviors and industry dynamics. In particular, a model with learning and forgetting can give rise to aggressive pricing behavior, varying degrees of long-run industry concentration ranging from moderate leadership to absolute dominance, and multiple equilibria. Copyright 2010 The Econometric Society.

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    Bibliographic Info

    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

    Volume (Year): 78 (2010)
    Issue (Month): 2 (03)
    Pages: 453-508

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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:78:y:2010:i:2:p:453-508

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    Cited by:
    1. Sebastian Kranz, 2012. "Discounted Stochastic Games with Voluntary Transfers," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1847, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
    2. Della Seta, Marco & Gryglewicz, Sebastian & Kort, Peter M., 2012. "Optimal investment in learning-curve technologies," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 36(10), pages 1462-1476.
    3. Hinloopen, J. & Smrkolj, G. & Wagener, F.O.O., 2013. "In Defense of Trusts: R&D Cooperation in Global Perspective," CeNDEF Working Papers 13-05, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    4. repec:dgr:uvatin:2011139 is not listed on IDEAS
    5. Besanko, David & Doraszelski, Ulrich & Lu, Lauren Xiaoyuan & Satterthwaite, Mark, 2010. "On the role of demand and strategic uncertainty in capacity investment and disinvestment dynamics," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 28(4), pages 383-389, July.
    6. Jeroen Hinloopen & Grega Smrkolj & Florian Wagener, 2011. "From Mind to Market: A Global, Dynamic Analysis of R&D," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 11-139/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    7. Narajabad, Borghan & Watson, Randal, 2011. "The dynamics of innovation and horizontal differentiation," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 35(6), pages 825-842, June.
    8. Carlos J.PĂ©rez & Carlos J.Ponce, 2013. "Disruption costs and the choice of technology," ILADES-Georgetown University Working Papers inv292, Ilades-Georgetown University, Universidad Alberto Hurtado/School of Economics and Bussines.
    9. Luca Colombo & Paola Labrecciosa, 2012. "Inter-firm knowledge diffusion, market power, and welfare," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 22(5), pages 1009-1027, November.
    10. Fudenberg, Drew & Yamamoto, Yuichi, 2011. "The folk theorem for irreducible stochastic games with imperfect public monitoring," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 146(4), pages 1664-1683, July.

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