This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

A Characterization of Interim Efficiency with Public Goods

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
John O. Ledyard
Thomas R. Palfrey
Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Download Info
To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Publisher Info
Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

Volume (Year): 67 (1999)
Issue (Month): 2 (March)
Pages: 435-448
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:67:y:1999:i:2:p:435-448

Contact details of provider:
Phone: 1 212 998 3820
Fax: 1 212 995 4487
Email:
Web page: http://www.econometricsociety.org/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Email:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishing.com/memb.asp?ref=0012-9682

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Christopher F. Baum).

Related research
Keywords:

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Martin Besfamille & Cecilia Parlatore Siritto, 2009. "Modernization of Tax Administrations and Optimal Fiscal Policies," Department of Economics Working Papers 2009-07, Universidad Torcuato Di Tella. [Downloadable!]
  2. Byungchae Rhee, 2004. "A Characterization of Optimal Feasible Tax Mechanism," Econometric Society 2004 Far Eastern Meetings 551, Econometric Society. [Downloadable!]
  3. Ledyard, John & Palfrey, Thomas, 2003. "A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments," Working Papers 1186, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  4. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods," Discussion Papers 265, SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich. [Downloadable!]
  5. Sean Gailmard & Thomas R. Palfrey, 2002. "An Experimental Comparison of Collective Choice Procedures for Excludable Public Goods," Working Papers 0214, Harris School of Public Policy Studies, University of Chicago. [Downloadable!]
  6. John Ledyard & Thomas Palfrey, 2003. "The Approximation of Efficient Public Good Mechanisms by Simple Voting Schemes," Levine's Bibliography 506439000000000103, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
  7. Kucuksenel, Serkan, . "Interim efficient mechanism design with interdependent valuations," Working Papers 1254, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences. [Downloadable!]
  8. Martin Hellwig, 2006. "The Provision and Pricing of Excludable Public Goods: Ramsey-Boiteux Pricing versus Bundling," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_21, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  9. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the legitimacy of coercion for the financing of public goods," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2009_15, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  10. Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Martimort, David, 2004. "The Design of Transnational Public Good Mechanisms for Developing Countries," IDEI Working Papers 267, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2006_23, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods. [Downloadable!]
  12. Stefano Barbieri & David Malueg, 2008. "Private provision of a discrete public good: efficient equilibria in the private-information contribution game," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 37(1), pages 51-80, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Martimort, David & De Donder, Philippe & De Villemeur, Étienne, 2003. "An Incomplete Contract Perspective on Public Good Provision," IDEI Working Papers 212, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Sven Fischer & Andreas Nicklisch, 2006. "Ex Interim Voting in Public Good Provision," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2006-13, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
  15. Felix Bierbrauer, 2009. "On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
  16. Byungchae Rhee, 2008. "A characterization of optimal feasible tax mechanism," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 30(4), pages 619-653, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Martimort, David & Moreira, Humberto Luiz Ataide, 2004. "Common agency with informed principals," Economics Working Papers (Ensaios Economicos da EPGE) 551, Graduate School of Economics, Getulio Vargas Foundation (Brazil). [Downloadable!]
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? No RePEc service, like IDEAS, charges for the use or the display of bibliographic data.

This page was last updated on 2009-12-8.


This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.