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Implementation of Reduced Form Auctions: A Geometric Approach

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  • Border, Kim C
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    Article provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.

    Volume (Year): 59 (1991)
    Issue (Month): 4 (July)
    Pages: 1175-87

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    Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:59:y:1991:i:4:p:1175-87

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    Cited by:
    1. Sandro Brusco & Giuseppe Lopomo, 2004. "Collusion via Signalling in Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auctions with Heterogeneous Objects, with and without Complementarities," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000385, UCLA Department of Economics.
    2. Aloisio Araujo & Luciano I. de Castro Filho, 2004. "Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions," Econometric Society 2004 Latin American Meetings 300, Econometric Society.
    3. Ledyard, John O & Palfrey, Thomas R, 1994. "Voting and Lottery Drafts as Efficient Public Goods Mechanisms," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 61(2), pages 327-55, April.
    4. Mierendorff, Konrad, 2011. "Asymmetric reduced form Auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 110(1), pages 41-44, January.
    5. Tilman Börgers & Peter Postl, 2005. "Efficient Compromising," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000801, UCLA Department of Economics.
    6. John Asker & Estelle Cantillon, 2010. "Procurement when Price and Quality Matter," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/99378, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
    7. Asker, John & Cantillon, Estelle, 2005. "Optimal Procurement When Both Price and Quality Matter," CEPR Discussion Papers 5276, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    8. Mallesh Pai & Rakesh Vohra, 2008. "Optimal Dynamic Auctions," Discussion Papers 1461, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
    9. Rahul Deb & Mallesh Pai, 2013. "Symmetric Auctions," Working Papers tecipa-486, University of Toronto, Department of Economics.
    10. Pai, Mallesh M. & Vohra, Rakesh, 2014. "Optimal auctions with financially constrained buyers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 383-425.
    11. Kim Border, 2007. "Reduced Form Auctions Revisited," Economic Theory, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 167-181, April.
    12. Kumru, Cagri & Yektas, Hadi, 2008. "Optimal Multi-Object Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers," MPRA Paper 7575, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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