IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/ecm/emetrp/v48y1980i2p447-56.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Strategic Voting in a Probabilistic Framework

Author

Listed:
  • Dutta, Bhaskar

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Dutta, Bhaskar, 1980. "Strategic Voting in a Probabilistic Framework," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 48(2), pages 447-456, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:48:y:1980:i:2:p:447-56
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198003%2948%3A2%3C447%3ASVIAPF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4&origin=repec
    File Function: full text
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Lok, R.B. & Romero Morales, D. & Vermeulen, A.J., 2005. "The agents-are-substitutes property in continuous generalized assignment problems," Research Memorandum 009, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    2. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," UFAE and IAE Working Papers 828.10, Unitat de Fonaments de l'Anàlisi Econòmica (UAB) and Institut d'Anàlisi Econòmica (CSIC).
    3. Ngwenyama, Ojelanki K. & Bryson, Noel, 1999. "Eliciting and mapping qualitative preferences to numeric rankings in group decision making," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 116(3), pages 487-497, August.
    4. Maus, Stefan & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2007. "Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 135(1), pages 533-544, July.
    5. Ehlers, Lars & Peters, Hans & Storcken, Ton, 2002. "Strategy-Proof Probabilistic Decision Schemes for One-Dimensional Single-Peaked Preferences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 105(2), pages 408-434, August.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecm:emetrp:v:48:y:1980:i:2:p:447-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/essssea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.