Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Econometric Society in its journal Econometrica.
Volume (Year): 45 (1977)
Issue (Month): 7 (October)
Other versions of this item:
- Roger B. Myerson, 1976. "Two-Person Bargaining Problems and Comparable Utility," Discussion Papers 247, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
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- Miguel Ginés Vilar & Francisco Marhuenda Hurtado, 1998.
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- Ehud Kalai, 1983. "Solutions to the Bargaining Problem," Discussion Papers 556, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Geoffroy de Clippel & Camelia Bejan, 2009.
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- Lajtos, Ildikó, 2010. "Verhandlungsverhalten und Anspruchsanpassung im internationalen Verhandlungsprozess: Die WTO-Agrarverhandlungen zum Abbau exportwettbewerbsfördernder Maßnahmen," Studies on the Agricultural and Food Sector in Central and Eastern Europe, Leibniz Institute of Agricultural Development in Central and Eastern Europe (IAMO), volume 55, number 94723.
- Marco-Gil, Maria del Carmen & Peris, Josep E. & Subiza, Begoña, 2012. "A Concessions-Based Mechanism for Meta-Bargaining Problems," QM&ET Working Papers 12-13, Universidad de Alicante, Departamento de Métodos Cuantitativos y Teoría Económica.
- Miguel Ángel Hinojosa & Amparo Mª Mármol & José Manuel Zarzuelo, 2007. "Multi-Utilitarian Bargaining Solutions," Working Papers 07.13, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Eric van Damme, 1984. "The Nash Bargaining Solution is Optimal," Discussion Papers 597, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science.
- Zvi A. Livne, 1981. "An Extension of the Nash Bargaining Problem: Introducing Time-Related Bargaining Costs," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 550, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
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