Does Regulation of Built‐in Security Reduce Crime? Evidence from a Natural Experiment
AbstractAs of 1999, all new-built homes in the Netherlands have to have burglary-proof windows and doors. We provide evidence that this large-scale government intervention in the use of self-protective measures lowers crime and improves social welfare. We find the regulatory change to have reduced burglary in new-built homes from 1.1 to 0.8 percent annually, a reduction of 26 percent. The findings suggest that burglars avoid old, less-protected homes that are located in the direct vicinity of the new, better-protected homes. The presence of a negative externality on older homes is ambiguous. We find no evidence for displacement to other property crimes including theft from cars and bicycle theft. Even though the regulation of built-in security does not target preventative measures at homes that are most at risk, the social benefits of the regulation are likely to exceed the social costs.
Download InfoTo our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.
Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 121 (2011)
Issue (Month): 552 (05)
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Office of the Secretary-General, School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC
Other versions of this item:
- Vollaard, B.A. & Ours, J.C. van, 2010. "Does Regulation of Built-in Security Reduce Crime? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," Discussion Paper 2010-019, Tilburg University, Tilburg Law and Economic Center.
- Vollaard, B.A. & Ours, J.C. van, 2010. "Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence From a Natural Experiment," Discussion Paper 2010-45, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- van Ours, Jan C. & Vollaard, Ben, 2010. "Does Regulation of Built-In Security Reduce Crime? Evidence from a Natural Experiment," CEPR Discussion Papers 7817, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1997.
"Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack,"
NBER Working Papers
5928, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, 1998. "Measuring Positive Externalities From Unobservable Victim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis Of Lojack," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 113(1), pages 43-77, February.
- Guido Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, 2007.
"Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice,"
NBER Technical Working Papers
0337, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Imbens, Guido W. & Lemieux, Thomas, 2008. "Regression discontinuity designs: A guide to practice," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 142(2), pages 615-635, February.
- Guido Imbens & Thomas Lemieux, 2007. "Regression Discontinuity Designs: A Guide to Practice," NBER Working Papers 13039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Vollaard, Ben & Koning, Pierre, 2009. "The effect of police on crime, disorder and victim precaution. Evidence from a Dutch victimization survey," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(4), pages 336-348, December.
- Peterson, Steven & Hoffer, George & Millner, Edward, 1995. "Are Drivers of Air-Bag-Equipped Cars More Aggressive? A Test of the Offsetting Behavior Hypothesis," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 38(2), pages 251-64, October.
- Nicole S. van der MEULEN, 2011. "Between Awareness and Ability: Consumers and Financial Identity Theft," Communications & Strategies, IDATE, Com&Strat dept., vol. 1(81), pages 23-44, 1st quart.
- Ours, J.C. van & Vollaard, B.A., 2013.
"The Engine Immobilizer: a Non-Starter For Car Thieves,"
2013-004, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
- Jan C. van Ours & Ben Vollaard, 2013. "The Engine Immobilizer: A Non-Starter for Car Thieves," CESifo Working Paper Series 4092, CESifo Group Munich.
- van Ours, Jan C & Vollaard, Ben, 2013. "The engine immobilizer: a non-starter for car thieves," CEPR Discussion Papers 9298, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Entorf, Horst, 2013. "Criminal Victims, Victimized Criminals, or Both? A Deeper Look at the Victim-Offender Overlap," IZA Discussion Papers 7686, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013.
"Private protection against crime when property value is private information,"
DICE Discussion Papers
91, Heinrich‐Heine‐Universität Düsseldorf, Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE).
- Baumann, Florian & Friehe, Tim, 2013. "Private protection against crime when property value is private information," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(C), pages 73-79.
- Florian Baumann & Tim Friehe, 2012. "Private Protection against Crime when Property Value is Private Information," CESifo Working Paper Series 3888, CESifo Group Munich.
- Cracau, Daniel & Franz, Benjamin, 2013. "Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 120(1), pages 1-4.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.
If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.