Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information
AbstractThis article considers a buyer-seller contracting model in which the seller possesses private information about all relevant aspects of the state of nature, including how much each action is worth to the buyer. I argue that, given asymmetric information, the buyer may not entirely dismiss an unforeseen contingency claim by the seller. Then, if the buyer lacks the foresight/awareness to 'expect the unexpected', the model admits an equilibrium in which a seemingly complete contract is written and then renegotiated along its outcome path to generate inefficiency "ex post". Copyright � 2008 The Author(s).
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 118 (2008)
Issue (Month): 528 (04)
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Other versions of this item:
- Jihong Lee, 2007. "Unforeseen Contingency and Renegotiation with Asymmetric Information," Birkbeck Working Papers in Economics and Finance 0717, Birkbeck, Department of Economics, Mathematics & Statistics.
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- L14 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Transactional Relationships; Contracts and Reputation
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