AbstractIt can be advantageous for an 'office motivated' party "A" to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party "A"'s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose a lot and do not benefit small groups of voters who gain a lot. Copyright 2004 Royal Economic Society.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.
Volume (Year): 114 (2004)
Issue (Month): 492 (01)
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Other versions of this item:
- Kai A. Konrad, 2003. "Inverse Campaigning," CESifo Working Paper Series 905, CESifo Group Munich.
- Konrad, Kai A., 2002. "Inverse campaigning," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance FS IV 02-29, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
- D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
- E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
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