Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this article or follow this journal

Inverse Campaigning

Contents:

Author Info

  • Kai A. Konrad

Abstract

It can be advantageous for an 'office motivated' party "A" to spend effort to make it public that a group of voters will lose from party "A"'s policy proposal. Such effort is called inverse campaigning. The inverse campaigning equilibria are described for the case where the two parties can simultaneously reveal information publicly to uninformed voters. Inverse campaigning dissipates the parties' rents and causes some inefficiency in expectation. Inverse campaigning also influences policy design. Successful policy proposals hurt small groups of voters who lose a lot and do not benefit small groups of voters who gain a lot. Copyright 2004 Royal Economic Society.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/servlet/useragent?func=synergy&synergyAction=showTOC&journalCode=ecoj&volume=114&issue=492&year=2004&part=null
File Function: link to full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 114 (2004)
Issue (Month): 492 (01)
Pages: 69-82

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:114:y:2004:i:492:p:69-82

Contact details of provider:
Postal: Office of the Secretary-General, School of Economics and Finance, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, Fife, KY16 9AL, UK
Phone: +44 1334 462479
Email:
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Dani Rodrik, 1996. "Understanding Economic Policy Reform," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 34(1), pages 9-41, March.
  2. Baye, M.R. & Kovenock, D. & De Varies, C.G., 1990. "The All-Pay Auction With Complete Information," Papers 9051, Tilburg - Center for Economic Research.
  3. Yeon-Koo Che & Ian Gale, 1998. "Caps on Political Lobbying," Microeconomics 9809003, EconWPA.
  4. Feddersen, Timothy J & Pesendorfer, Wolfgang, 1996. "The Swing Voter's Curse," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 86(3), pages 408-24, June.
  5. Harrington, Joseph Jr. & Hess, Gregory D., 1996. "A Spatial Theory of Positive and Negative Campaigning," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 17(2), pages 209-229, December.
  6. Arye L. Hillman & John G. Riley, 1987. "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers," UCLA Economics Working Papers 452, UCLA Department of Economics.
  7. Glazer, A. & Konrad, K.A., 1991. "The Evaluation of Risky Projects by Voters," GSIA Working Papers 1991-40, Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business.
  8. Fernandez, Raquel & Rodrik, Dani, 1991. "Resistance to Reform: Status Quo Bias in the Presence of Individual-Specific Uncertainty," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(5), pages 1146-55, December.
  9. Dirk Bergemann & Juuso Valimaki, 1996. "Learning and Strategic Pricing," Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers 1113, Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics, Yale University.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Klaas Beniers & Robert Dur, 2007. "Politicians’ motivation, political culture, and electoral competition," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 14(1), pages 29-54, February.
  2. Kai A. Konrad & Dan Kovenock, 2005. "Equilibrium and Efficiency in the Tug-of-War," CESifo Working Paper Series 1564, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Barbaro, Salvatore & Suedekum, Jens, 2005. "The Interaction of Tax Exemptions and Individual Tax Reform Preferences," IZA Discussion Papers 1543, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
  4. Seel, Christian, 2013. "The Value of Information in Asymmetric All-Pay Auctions," Annual Conference 2013 (Duesseldorf): Competition Policy and Regulation in a Global Economic Order 79930, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
  5. Baye, Michael R. & Kovenock, Dan & Vries, Casper G. de, 2009. "Contests with rank-order spillovers," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Market Processes and Governance SP II 2009-09, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  6. Pastine, Ivan & Pastine, Tuvana, 2012. "Incumbency advantage and political campaign spending limits," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 96(1), pages 20-32.
  7. Salvatore Barbaro & Jens Suedekum, 2009. "Voting on income tax exemptions," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 138(1), pages 239-253, January.
  8. Jan K. Brueckner & Kangoh Lee, 2013. "Negative Campaigning in a Probabilistic Voting Model," CESifo Working Paper Series 4233, CESifo Group Munich.
  9. Barbaro, Salvatore & Suedekum, Jens, 2006. "Reforming a complicated income tax system: The political economy perspective," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 41-59, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:114:y:2004:i:492:p:69-82. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.