1. Lindbeck, A & Nyberg, S & Weibull, J-W, 1997. "Social Norms and Economic Incentives in the Welfare State," Research Institute of Industrial Economics Working Papers 476, Research Institute of Industrial Economics (IFN).
   Other versions:
   • Assar Lindbeck & Sten Nyberg & Jšrgen W. Weibull, 1999. "Social Norms And Economic Incentives In The Welfare State," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 114(1), pages 1-35, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Fershtman, Chaim & Weiss, Yoram, 1993. "Social Status, Culture and Economic Performance," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 946-59, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y., 1991. "Social Status , Culture and Economic Performance," Papers 32-91, Tel Aviv.
   • Chaim Fershtman & Yoram Weiss, 1991. "Social Status, Culture and Economic Performance," Discussion Papers 1007, Northwestern University, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics and Management Science. [Downloadable!]
3. Ehrlich, Isaac & Becker, Gary S, 1972. "Market Insurance, Self-Insurance, and Self-Protection," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 80(4), pages 623-48, July-Aug.. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Dutta, Prajit K. & Radner, Roy, 1994. "Moral hazard," Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, in: R.J. Aumann & S. Hart (ed.), Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, edition 1, volume 2, chapter 26, pages 869-903 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Cho, In-Koo & Kreps, David M, 1987. "Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 102(2), pages 179-221, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
6. Gottfries, N. & Mccormick, B., 1990. "Discrimination And Open Unemployment In A Segmented Labour Market," Papers 460, Stockholm - International Economic Studies.
   Other versions:
   • Gottfries, Nils & McCormick, Barry, 1995. "Discrimination and open unemployment in a segmented labour market," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 39(1), pages 1-15, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
7. Arnott, Richard & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1991. "Moral Hazard and Nonmarket Institutions: Dysfunctional Crowding Out or Peer Monitoring?," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 81(1), pages 179-90, March. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
8. Shavell, Steven, 1979. "On Moral Hazard and Insurance," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 93(4), pages 541-62, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Kandel, Eugene & Lazear, Edward P, 1992. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 100(4), pages 801-17, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   Other versions:
   • Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1989. "Peer Pressure And Partnership," Papers e-89-5, Stanford - Hoover Institution.
   • Kandel, E. & Lazear, E.P., 1990. "Peer Pressure and Partnerships," Papers 90-07, Rochester, Business - Managerial Economics Research Center.
10. Fershtman, C. & Weiss,Y., 1995. "Social Rewards, Externalities and Stable Preferences," Papers 32-95, Tel Aviv.
    Other versions:
    • Fershtman, C. & Weiss, Y., 1996. "Social Rewards Externalities and Stable Preferences," Papers 17-96, Tel Aviv.
    • Fershtman, C & Weiss, Y., 1996. "Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences," Discussion Paper 28, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research. [Downloadable!]
    • Fershtman, Chaim & Weiss, Yoram, 1998. "Social rewards, externalities and stable preferences," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(1), pages 53-73, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
11. Besley, Timothy & Coate, Stephen, 1992. "Understanding welfare stigma: Taxpayer resentment and statistical discrimination," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 165-183, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
    • Besley, T. & Coate, S., 1990. "Understanding Welfare Stigma: Taxpayer Resentment And Statistical Discrimination," Papers 42, Princeton, Woodrow Wilson School - Discussion Paper.
12. Bernheim, B Douglas, 1994. "A Theory of Conformity," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(5), pages 841-77, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)

Cited by:
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1. Ernst Fehr, 2003. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," Microeconomics 0305010, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, . "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IEW - Working Papers iewwp095, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
   • Falk, Armin & Fehr, Ernst, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CEPR Discussion Papers 3185, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
   • Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," IZA Discussion Papers 507, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA). [Downloadable!]
   • Ernst Fehr & Armin Falk, 2002. "Psychological Foundations of Incentives," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   • Fehr, Ernst & Falk, Armin, 2002. "Psychological foundations of incentives," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 46(4-5), pages 687-724, May. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
2. Charness, Gary & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2003. "Promises & Partnership," Research Papers in Economics 2003:3, Stockholm University, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises & Partnership," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 07-06, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
3. Alessandro Balestrino & Cinzia Ciardi, 2007. "Social Norms, Cognitive Dissonance and the Timing of Marriage," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Balestrino, Alessandro & Ciardi, Cinzia, 2008. "Social norms, cognitive dissonance and the timing of marriage," The Journal of Socio-Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(6), pages 2399-2410, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
4. Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Working Papers 287, IGIER (Innocenzo Gasparini Institute for Economic Research), Bocconi University. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Pierpaolo Battigalli & Martin Dufwenberg, 2005. "Dynamic Psychological Games," Levine's Bibliography 784828000000000046, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   • Battigalli, Pierpaolo & Dufwenberg, Martin, 2009. "Dynamic psychological games," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 144(1), pages 1-35, January. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
5. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, . "Why Social Preferences Matter - The Impact of Non-Selfish Motives on Competition," IEW - Working Papers iewwp084, Institute for Empirical Research in Economics - IEW. [Downloadable!]
6. Gary Charness & Antonio Cabrales, 2008. "Optimal Contracts With Team Production And Hidden Information: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 12-08, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2008. "Optimal Contracts with Team Production and Hidden Information: An Experiment," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series 11-03, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara. [Downloadable!]
7. Alessandro Balestrino, 2009. "Tax avoidance, endogenous social norms, and the comparison income effect," CHILD Working Papers wp15_09, CHILD - Centre for Household, Income, Labour and Demographic economics - ITALY. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Alessandro Balestrino, . "Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison Income Effect," EPRU Working Paper Series 05-15, Economic Policy Research Unit (EPRU), University of Copenhagen. Department of Economics, revised Dec 2005. [Downloadable!]
   • Alessandro Balestrino, 2006. "Tax Avoidance, Endogenous Social Norms, and the Comparison Income Effect," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
8. Alessandro Balestrino, 2007. "It is a Theft but not a Crime," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Balestrino, Alessandro, 2008. "It is a theft but not a crime," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 24(2), pages 455-469, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
9. Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2004. "Promises and Partnership," Levine's Bibliography 122247000000000001, UCLA Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
   Other versions:
   • Gary Charness & Martin Dufwenberg, 2006. "Promises and Partnership," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 74(6), pages 1579-1601, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
10. Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, 2004. "Social norms and human cooperation," Macroeconomics 0409026, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
11. Antonio Cabrales & Gary Charness, 2000. "Optimal Contracts, Adverse Selection, and Social Preferences: An Experiment," Economics Working Papers 478, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. [Downloadable!]
12. Matthew Jowett, 2004. "Theoretical insights into the development of health insurance in low-income countries," Working Papers 188chedp, Centre for Health Economics, University of York. [Downloadable!]