Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Fiscal Policy Coordination with Demand Spillovers and Unionised Labour Markets

Contents:

Author Info

  • Dixon, Huw David
  • Santoni, Michele

Abstract

The authors explore the incentives for governments to cooperate by expanding expenditure. They have three countries: two are in a monetary union (the EMU). The labour markets of both the EMU countries are unionized and there is involuntary unemployment in equilibrium. The authors explore the intra- and intercountry effects of changes in bargaining power. They then examine optimal government expenditures in each EMU country; the authors find that there is a positive spillover and that expenditures are strategic complements. The coordinated equilibrium involves higher expenditure than the uncoordinated equilibrium. Copyright 1997 by Royal Economic Society.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0013-0133%28199703%29107%3A441%3C403%3AFPCWDS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4&origin=bc
File Function: full text
Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to JSTOR subscribers. See http://www.jstor.org for details.

As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version under "Related research" (further below) or search for a different version of it.

Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Royal Economic Society in its journal The Economic Journal.

Volume (Year): 107 (1997)
Issue (Month): 441 (March)
Pages: 403-17

as in new window
Handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:107:y:1997:i:441:p:403-17

Contact details of provider:
Web page: http://www.res.org.uk/
More information through EDIRC

Order Information:
Web: http://www.blackwellpublishers.co.uk/asp/journal.asp?ref=0013-0133

Related research

Keywords:

References

No references listed on IDEAS
You can help add them by filling out this form.

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Roel Beetsma & Lans Bovenberg, 2001. "Structural Distortions and Decentralized Fiscal Policies in EMU," CESifo Working Paper Series 473, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Roel Beetsma & Xavier Debrun & Frank Klaassen, 2001. "Is Fiscal Policy Coordination in EMU Desirable?," CESifo Working Paper Series 599, CESifo Group Munich.
  3. Jorge Blázquez & José M. Martín-Moreno, 2002. "Capital privado y competencia internacional: la armonización fiscal nunca es suficiente," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 26(2), pages 359-372, May.
  4. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Wage and public expenditure setting in a monetary union," Macroeconomics 0105002, EconWPA.
  5. Nicola Acocella & Giovanni Di Bartolomeo, 2001. "Partisanship and fiscal policy co-ordination in a monetary union," Macroeconomics 0106003, EconWPA.
  6. Carmen Díaz Roldán, 2000. "Coordination of fiscal policies in a monetary union," Documentos de Trabajo - Lan Gaiak Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra 0003, Departamento de Economía - Universidad Pública de Navarra.
  7. Emmanuelle Taugourdeau, 2002. "Imperfect Competition and Fiscal Policy Transmission in a Two-Country Economy," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 13(1), pages 47-71, January.
  8. Büttner, Thiess, 1999. "Regional Stabilization by Fiscal Equalization? Theoretical Considerations and Empirical Evidence from Germany," ZEW Discussion Papers 99-23, ZEW - Zentrum für Europäische Wirtschaftsforschung / Center for European Economic Research.
  9. Jean-Paul Fitoussi & Francesco Saraceno, 2002. "A Theory of Social Custom of Which Soft Growth May Be One Consequence. Tales of the European Stability Pact," Documents de Travail de l'OFCE 2002-07, Observatoire Francais des Conjonctures Economiques (OFCE).

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:ecj:econjl:v:107:y:1997:i:441:p:403-17

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Wiley-Blackwell Digital Licensing) or (Christopher F. Baum).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.