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A theoretical model of the distribution of teacher attention under benchmark testing

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Author Info
Justin Ross () (School of Public & Environmental Affairs - Indiana University, Bloomington)

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Abstract

This paper provides a simple theoretical model designed to capture the targeting incentives created by benchmark testing. Under high-stakes benchmark testing, schools and teachers are judged on the fraction of students that meet some given level of educational attainment. The incentive for teachers is then to allocate their resources towards students who are on the margin of the pass/fail level of educational attainment. This behavior has some empirical support and the aim of the model is to provide a formal means of developing hypotheses for future research.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume9/EB-08I20014A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 9 (2008)
Issue (Month): 29 ()
Pages: 1-8
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:9:y:2008:i:29:p:1-8

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: Education; Teacher Incentives; No Child Left Behind; Student Achievement; Standardized Testing;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
I2 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

  1. Randall Reback, 2006. "Teaching to the Rating: School Accountability and the Distribution of Student Achievement," Working Papers 0602, Barnard College, Department of Economics. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  2. Burgess, Simon & Propper, Carol & Slater, Helen & Wilson, Deborah, 2005. "Who wins and who loses from school accountability? The distribution of educational gain in English secondary schools," CEPR Discussion Papers 5248, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  3. Brown, Byron W & Saks, Daniel H, 1975. "The Production and Distribution of Cognitive Skills within Schools," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 83(3), pages 571-93, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Brian A. Jacob, 2002. "Accountability, Incentives and Behavior: The Impact of High-Stakes Testing in the Chicago Public Schools," NBER Working Papers 8968, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Full references

Statistics
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Did you know? Springer Verlag was the first commercial publisher to be listed on RePEc.

This page was last updated on 2009-10-20.

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