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Non-Compliance under a Negative Income Tax

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Author Info
Martin Halla () (University of Linz; IZA)
Friedrich Schneider () (University of Linz; CESifo, CREMA & IZA)

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In this note we model the individual decision on income underreporting in a system with a negative income tax. We show that a change in the tax rate has opposing effects on the compliance behavior of the poor and the rich.

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File URL: http://economicsbulletin.vanderbilt.edu/2008/volume8/EB-08H20001A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 8 (2008)
Issue (Month): 8 ()
Pages: 1-3
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2008:i:8:p:1-3

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Postal: Economics Bulletin, Department of Economics, 414 Calhoun Hall, Vanderbilt University, Nashville TN 37235, USA
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Related research
Keywords: Negative income tax; tax evasion; benefit fraud; welfare fraud.;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
H2 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
H3 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents

References listed on IDEAS
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  1. Allingham, Michael G. & Sandmo, Agnar, 1972. "Income tax evasion: a theoretical analysis," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(3-4), pages 323-338, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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Statistics
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This page was last updated on 2009-12-12.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.