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A trace of anger is enough: on the enforcement of social norms

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Author Info
Jakub Steiner () (The University of Edinburgh)

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Abstract

It is well documented that the possibility of punishing free-riders increases contributions in one-shot public good games. I demonstrate theoretically that minimal punishment commitments (perhaps provided by anger) may lead to high contribution levels. Thus, almost selfish players may behave as strong reciprocators.

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File URL: http://www.accessecon.com/pubs/EB/2007/Volume8/EB-07H40001A.pdf
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Publisher Info
Article provided by AccessEcon in its journal Economics Bulletin.

Volume (Year): 8 (2007)
Issue (Month): 1 ()
Pages: 1-4
Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Handle: RePEc:ebl:ecbull:v:8:y:2007:i:1:p:1-4

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Related research
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
H4 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods
C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory

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This page was last updated on 2010-1-6.

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