Christopher Bailey () (Central Michigan University) Jason Taylor () (Central Michigan University)
Abstract
While many economists have theorized and/or empirically demonstrated that labor-leisure decisions are influenced by the rate of taxation, this note introduces a new mechanism in which the collecting of taxes on income may affect such decisions. Although standard models assume that agents have no preference for the size and scope of government activity, recent and past political rhetoric suggests that preferences do exist. We examine how labor-leisure decisions can be affected when taxes are derived from income and agents’ utility functions include a preference for government size.
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Publisher Info
Article provided by Economics Bulletin in its journal Economics Bulletin.
Find related papers by JEL classification: H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government J2 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor
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